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I. INTRODUCTION
Overgrazing of public lands has been and remains a serious threat to
the ecological stability of the nation's federal lands. Grazing has led to
desertification of large areas of land.' A half century ago, Aldo Leopold
contrasted the impact of American settlement on Kentucky, in which the
landscape evolved from canelands to blue grass but maintained its ecological stability, to the pioneers' impact on the Southwest in which intense
use of the arid land led to soil erosion, loss of species, and slow but
definite degradation of the ecosystem.2 The American habit of treating all
lands as equally suitable for settlement and economic exploitation, whether the moist East or the arid Southwest, produced, in Leopold's view, a
"wrecked landscape."'
Human interaction with the land requires an ecological perspective,
meaning that people are aware of their impact on ecosystems and the
potential results of that impact. Without such a perspective, humans can
threaten the long-term stability of ecosystems, and, therefore, human
communities as well. Ecology relies both on a scientific understanding of
the functioning of plants and animals and an historical understanding of
how, over time, those species interact with each other, the climate, and
humans. Without this historical and scientific perspective, human societies
might not understand the dangers posed by ecologically ignorant land
management. Of the Southwest's decline, Leopold explained, "[s]o subtle
has been its progress that few residents of the region are aware of it. It is
quite invisible to the tourist who finds the wrecked landscape colorful and
charming .

.

. ."

Since assuming office in 1993, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt has spearheaded Clinton Administration efforts to introduce an eco-

1. ALDo LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETcHES HERE AND THERE 205-06

(1949).
Id.
3. Id.at206.
4. Id.
2.
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logical perspective into government policy in the form of a new western
land ethic.' Rather than manage the public lands for the benefit of a few
private interests, Babbitt has said he aims to care for the land in order to
serve multiple public interests such as watershed protection, recreation,
wildlife conservation and ecosystem stability. 6 In this way, Babbitt's goal
seems similar to Leopold's vision of having people see the land as an
interconnected whole-a "collective organism" having many valuesrather than a "servant" 7 having only economic value. One of the primary
expressions of this new land ethic is an attempt to reform the way ranchers have used public lands as a commodity for the grazing of their cattle
and sheep.
President Clinton and Secretary Babbitt took office with the express
intention of reforming the allocation of federal grazing leases to private
ranchers. They intended to make ranchers pay closer to the market value
for grazing permits, to institute reforms to encourage ranchers to use
good, ecologically-sound land stewardship principles and to end management inconsistencies between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and
the Forest Service, the agencies that lease the most public land to ranchers. 9 In short, the Clinton Administration sought to treat federal grazing
land as the renewable but exhaustible natural resource that it is.' 0
On the way to this new land ethic, politics got in the way of Clinton and
Babbitt. Ranching interests and environmentalists attacked the reforms," and
the administration dropped plans to raise grazing fees through the rulemaking
process.12 The BLM's final regulations went into effect August 21, 1995," 3
while the Forest Service decided to put its regulations "on hold" due to uncer-

5. Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and The Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use"
Failed, 18 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 405, 431 (1994).
6. Id.
7. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 223.
8. Babbitt: High Fees and No GrazersDoesn't Help Range, PUB. LANDS NEWS, February 4,
1993, at 2 [hereinafter Babbitt: High Fees].
9. BLM Grazing Administration Grazing Reform Announcement, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208
(1993). A small amount of grazing occurs on National Wildlife Refuges and some National Park
areas. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 688 (3d

ed. 1993).
10. A renewable resource is nevertheless exhaustible if it is damaged, polluted or used up
faster than the resource can replenish itself. For example, timber is renewable, but if logging companies clear forests too quickly, the supply can run out.
11. Babbitt's Rangeland Plan Pleases Nobody, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 19, 1994, at 16-A.
12. InteriorDepartment Defers Decision on New Grazing Fee Structure to Congress, B.N.A.
NAT'L ENV'T DAILY, Dec. 30, 1994.
13. BLM Grazing Administration Final Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 9,894 (1995) [hereinafter BLM
Final Rules], New Grazing Rules Called Slow-Paced, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 26, 1995, at 32A;
Weaning West's Ranchers Off 'Cowboy Socialism,' L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at Part-M.
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tainty over what the Republican Congress might do with grazing policy. 4 The
BLM's final product is different in many ways from earlier proposals, and
members of Congress have expressed a strong desire to substitute their own
rules for the Administration's. 5 This analysis of the Administration's grazing
reforms reveals what the regulations aspire to accomplish, what they could
have done if ranching interests had not succeeded in weakening them, and
whether the revised regulations are an improvement over the status quo.
Examining the politics of the reform process can explain the causes of the
Administration's tactical retreat from its goal of raising fees and can also
assess the current state and future prospects of the Leopold/Babbitt land ethic.
Section II of this article provides an overview of the history of grazing on federal lands, both before and after the passage of the Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934. Section III then discusses the content and impact of
recent calls for reform of federal grazing policy, leading up to the Clinton
Administration's early policy goals. Section IV supplies an in-depth explanation and analysis of the Administration's attempts to reform grazing
rules. The Administration's plans have evolved into generally weaker
versions, and Section V assesses the causes, results, and value of this
evolution. The paper concludes that Leopold's vision offers a rational,
humble, and essential blueprint for our society's relationship with the
environment and calls for the adoption of Leopold's land ethic through
reforms stronger than the revised regulations, based on a greater understanding of the different types of public lands and the realization that the
historical pattern of overgrazing must end before federal lands can
achieve ecological stability.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Growth of Grazing up to the Taylor Grazing Act
When the first Spanish longhorn cattle reached New Mexico in the
16th century, ranching grew slowly. 6 Only a few Spaniards, and later
Mexicans, raised cattle in the arid Southwest. Animal husbandry began at
Church missions, which raised mainly sheep, and on large land grants
controlled by aristocrats. 7 Spanish armies also herded cattle and sheep to

14. Telephone Interview with Berwin Brown, Range Expert, Forest Service (Nov. 13, 1995).
As of the date of this writing, the Forest Service has yet to publish final rules.
15. Congress Fails to Pass Range Policy; Senate Votes Regs Bar, PuB. LANDS NEWS, Aug.
17, 1995, at 2-3.
16. DENZEL AND NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED Cows AT THE PUBLIC TROUGH 11 (1983).
17. WILLIAM VOIGT, JR., PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUSTRY AND
GOVERNMENT 17-18 (1976).
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provide an easily-produced food source in the untamed Southwest. 8 The
western United States inherited Spanish ranching methods, which had
produced a history of overgrazing in Spain. 9 The cattle, descended from
Spanish longhorns, were hardy and able to withstand harsh conditions.20
Cattle did not reach the Northwest until British fur traders brought
some to Astoria, Oregon in 1814.21 Western ranching on a large scale by
U.S. citizens began with trading posts along trails, raising herds to sell to
those settlers who had lost their own animals during the difficult journey
west.' Many went west with the belief that cattle and sheep meant easy
money.' With no government regulation, no property taxes, and a need for
only minimal supervision of hardy livestock, that belief often proved true.
The growth of railroads and mining, as well as the expansion of the
Army to subdue Native Americans, caused the Western livestock industry
to grow. Railroads allowed faster shipment of livestock, and the miners,
soldiers, and settlers formed a growing local market for meat. By the
mid-1800s, so many cattle roamed the Southwest that ranchers often
slaughtered them just for their hides and tallow, and still made money.'
When state laws did address grazing, the laws usually protected
ranchers' interests by relying on ranching custom that had developed over
decades.' The livestock industry was well-represented in early state legislatures, since it was one of the few organized interests in western states.?
The general rule was that grass was free and belonged to the user. Although ranchers shaped laws to fit their needs, they often went outside the
law to protect their interests. Ranchers hired gunmen to control land, used
illegal methods to control rustlers and to keep homesteaders from taking
valuable land, and controlled huge ranches like medieval fiefdoms, consisting of both public and private land.'
The Civil War was the immediate cause of several events which
contributed to the swift growth of Western ranching. Congress, unimped-

18. Id. at 18.
19. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 11.
20. Id.
21. Id.at 12.
22. VoIGT, supra note 17, at 18.

23. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 4.
24. Id.at 12.

25.

Richard E. Shannon, The Taylor Grazing Act: A 50 Year Perspective, WESTERN

WILDLANDs, Spring 1985, at 2.

26. Id.
27. Id. This custom was generally upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Buford v.
Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
28.

Id. at 323-25, 329.
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ed by regional strife since Southern members had left, approved the
Homestead Act,29 which allowed more settlement, and a route for a transcontinental railroad. As a result, ranches in the Far West could send cattle
east at a reasonable expense.3' In addition, when Union forces cut Texas
off from the eastern part of the Confederacy, cattle could not be sent to
market, and by the end of the war, Texan herds had increased dramatically. 3 When the war ended, ranchers invented the large-scale cattle drive to
take the Texan cattle to unstocked interior areas and to railroad lines that
would take the cattle to markets North and South.32
As railroads expanded after the Civil War, huge herds of livestock
developed. 33 In 1870, four to five million cattle roamed the seventeen
western states, but by 1884, the peak year, thirty-five to forty million
cattle grazed on Western land, a 600% to 900% increase.34 Sheep multiplied even more dramatically, from a half million in 1850 to twenty
million by 1890, a 3900% increase.35 These great herds of livestock had
to compete with each other and with herds of wild horses for forage.36
They also competed with homesteaders for good land. As farmers took
the best lands, ranchers were forced to move more livestock to the arid
intermountain region.37 To help ranchers, Congress authorized larger
homesteads of up to 640 acres in the arid West, 8 but that was not enough
land for a successful ranch in such an arid region. As a result, ranchers
continued to use public domain land as they always had.39
Ranching also relied on subjugation of Native American tribes for
expansion. The Army removed both the bison and the tribes that relied on
them.' Congress often reduced the size of Indian reservations in response to
calls from settlers and ranchers. 4' Ranchers ran livestock illegally on reservations, and government officials did little about trespassing or corrupt leasing

29. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed 1976). Southern members of Congress had opposed previous
homesteading bills fearing that new anti-slavery states would result. COGGINS, supra note 9, at 83.
30. VOIGT, supra note 17. at 21.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 13.
34. LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE WEST: PUBiC LANDS RANCHING 11 (1991).

35. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 15.
36. Id.at 14.
37. Id. at 13-14.
38. The Kinkaid Act of 1903, 43 U.S.C. § 224 (repealed 1976), the Enlarged Homestead Act
of 1916, 43 U.S.C. § 218 (repealed 1976), and the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 219-301 (repealed 1976).
39. George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management I: The Commons and the Taylor Act. 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 20 (1982).
40. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 10.
41. Id. at 15.
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agreements.42 The officials often were ranchers or cowboys themselves, and
ranchers expected them to cater to the livestock industry. 40
The government created ecological problems by encouraging unlimited grazing and doing little, if anything, to protect the land. Even in the
moist East, where farmers usually kept cattle confined, overgrazing occurred. ' In the arid West, where ranchers had little oversight of livestock
and the land usually was not well-suited for grazing due to poor soil and a
short growing season, overgrazing was more likely and harder to avoid.4'
Also, droughts and harsh winters often led to catastrophic losses of animals and extensive damage to the land. 6 In 1886, Montana's weather was
dry, but ranchers brought many cattle to the region anyway. By the time
winter came, over a million cattle roamed the territory. That year, winter
was early and harsh. The spring of 1887 revealed the results of laissezfaire grazing: "When the snow finally melted, thousands of dead cattle
bobbed among the ice floes moving down the swollen streams-a procession of bodies testifying to the immensity of the tragedy."'v In eastern
Montana, up to 70% of cattle perished. Ranchers in the territory suffered
an estimated loss of $20 million."
For many years, ranchers accepted these large losses as a normal part of
business in the West.49 Putting livestock on the range was a relatively easy
investment, and ranchers preferred to gamble for profits.' Ranchers did not
have a strong incentive to care about the damage being done because they had
invested little, if any, money in land and, if livestock wore out part of the
public domain, they could easily seek better forage elsewhere. In addition, the
deterioration of the Western range was not always easy to notice. Unlike
logging, which can leave clear, dramatic impacts on a forest, ranching can
damage the range ecosystem through a "slow, insidious process." 5 While
John Wesley Powell, famous explorer of the Colorado River, wrote of the
deterioration of grasses and increase in erosion in Utah, 2 most people did not
notice the problem or did not consider it to be urgent.5 3

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 27-28.
JACOBS, supra note 34, at 14.
FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 12.
CoGGiNs, supra note 9, at 693.
FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 19.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 16-17 for information on Montana.
Id. at 16.
Id.

51. VOIGT, supra note 17, at 32-33.
52. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGIONS OF THE UNITED

STATES 88 (Wallace Stegner ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1962) (1879).
53. VOIGT, supra note 17, at 34-35.
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Heavy losses, however, helped convince many people that overgrazing
was a problem.- The winter of 1886 to 1887 severely hurt the ranching
industry from southern Colorado to Canada and from the 100th Meridian to
the western slopes of the Rocky Mountains. 5 The hard winter of 1889 to
1890, which forced many ranchers into bankruptcy, ended the era of yearround grazing in the intermountain region, but periodic droughts continued to
cause large losses. 6 The harsh weather, together with ranchers' shortsightedness, the advent of barbed wire-which enabled large operations to enclose
huge ranches-and a decreasing market in the 1880s, all forced the industry
to evolve from an adventure into a business.57
When President Teddy Roosevelt organized the Forest Service in
1905, ranchers had free reign in the forest reserves which the government
had established. 58 The new agency made the first attempts at regulating
the livestock industry. In 1906 Roosevelt, through his Forest Service
Chief, Gifford Pinchot, introduced a fee of five cents per animal unit
month (AUM). 59 This first attempt at regulation met strong resistance
from ranchers used to independence, but Roosevelt and Pinchot stuck to
their policy in order to assert federal authority over the previously ignored public domain.60 Pinchot reasoned that just as timber companies
should not get trees for free, so too ranchers should not get grass for
free.6 ' The new national forests existed to provide for the long-term benefits of the whole people, rather than the short-term benefits of companies
or individuals.62 The Forest Service went on to develop a rational grazing
program to heal the tired land,3 but World War I's demand for resources
led to a large increase in federal grazing, which decreased only slowly
after the war.'
This era of recklessness damaged the land. The results were altered
vegetation and drastic changes in landscape.' Many areas had become
54. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 16.

55. JOHN CLAY, MY LIFE ON THE RANGE 208 (1962).
56. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 19. For example, a severe drought in the Southwest from
1891 to 1893 caused losses of 50% to 75% to livestock herds. Id. at 19.
57.

THE WESTERN RANGE, S. Doc. No. 199, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. 124 (1936).

58. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 33-34.
59. An AUM is the amount of forage consumed monthly by one bull, one cow and her calf, or
five sheep.
60. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 34.
61. VoIGT, supra note 17, at 47.
62. Id. at 44.
63. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 35.
64. VoIGT, supra note 17, at 53-54. In 1908, the Forest Service authorized 14 million AUMs,
but by 1918, the last year of the war, AUMs were up to 20.4 million. Authorized AUMS were 17.2
million in 1923. and 12.6 million in 1928. Id.
65. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 11.
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virtual deserts; streams dried up, the once ubiquitous range grasses were
less common and less healthy.6 Changes in the way ranchers operated
were essential.
As early as 1878, John Wesley Powell proposed reorganizing the
way the government managed the arid Western lands, including establishing and leasing grazing districts.67 Congress considered bills to establish such a leasing system for grazing districts as early as 1899.1 In
1928, a group of Montana ranchers asked for, and the federal government
agreed to, a withdrawal of 108,000 acres of public land in order to lease
it to the ranchers for the exclusive right to graze livestock there.69 This
was the first experiment with grazing permits and foreshadowed grazing
reforms which would greatly change the way ranchers used the public
domain.
B. The Taylor GrazingAct and Its Aftermath
The Great Depression and a severe drought left the livestock industry on the brink of ruin in the early 1930s.71 Congress responded with the
passage of the Taylor Grazing Act7' (TGA) in 1934, finally asserting its
control over the public domain. No longer was the public domain ignored
and left to the local users to control by custom or state law. Through a
new Division of Grazing and a system of grazing permits, federal law
would now decide who could graze livestock on the land, how many
livestock could graze, and how much the ranchers would need to pay for
the right to graze. In the same breath, however, the law left most of those
decisions to the ranchers by creating a system of self-government through
local Grazing Advisory Boards.2
Congress intended the TGA to end open range grazing and indiscriminate settlement on the public domain in order to stabilize the grazing
industry and restore the land.73 Grazing was still the dominant use of the

66. COGGINS, supra note 9, at 693.
67. POWELL, supra note 52, at 33-36. Powell and his team even included in their report a draft
version of a bill "to authorize the organization of pasturage districts by homestead settlements on the
public lands which are of value for pasturage purposes only." Id. at 45-49.
68. PHILLIP 0. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE PUBuc DOMAIN 41-43 (1960).

69. Shannon, supra note 25, at 3.
70. Coggins & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 39, at 40.
71. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).

72. Shannon, supra note 25, at 3-4.
73. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 17. The TGA lists the goals of grazing districts as being "to
regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary injury, [and] to provide for the orderly use, improvement, and development of the range ....
"
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public domain: the Grazing Advisory Boards, made up of ranchers, would
carve up the public domain into grazing districts, decide who acquired
grazing permits, and set general rules for grazing throughout the western
public lands.74 The TGA established a preference for issuing permits to

adjacent landowners, effectively giving grazing rights to the historic users.7' However, the Act did not give property rights to the ranchers, thus
allowing grazing without payment of property taxes, but also leaving
ranchers more vulnerable to government control. 76 Although the retention
of lands by the federal government would come back to haunt the ranchers, in the first few decades after the TGA, ranchers successfully intimidated the Division of Grazing into asserting little authority, leaving control to the local advisory boards. 77 Still, the TGA stemmed further degradation of the land78 and served as a foundation for later regulation.
C. Modern Legislation
With a growing Western population and greater concentration of people
in urban and suburban areas, the federal government faces a growing demand
for uses of public lands (including grazing, minerals, recreation, water, and
preservation) that outpaces the supply.79 This scarcity has led to attempts to

balance competing interests and to prevent any one interest from hindering
others. The Classification and Multiple Use Act (CMUA) 8 of 1964 ordered
the Bureau of Land Management to study its lands and the authorized use of
BLM lands for more than grazing."' The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)n of 1976 and the Public Rangelands Improvement Act
(PRIA)n of 1978 went beyond the TGA and CMUA to give more management power and responsibilities to the BLM and the Forest Service over
grazing and other uses of the public lands.8'

43 U.S.C. § 315a (1994).
74. Shannon, supra note 25, at 4.
75. COGGINS, supra note 9, at 694.
76. Shannon, supra note 25, at 4. See also Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315
(D.C. Cir. 1938), where the court held that grazing rights under the TGA are not vested property
rights: "We recognize that the rights under the Taylor Grazing Act do not fall within the conventional
category of vested rights in property." See also U.S. v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) which held that
the value of grazing permits is not part of the fair market value of a ranch taken by eminent domain.
77. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 18.
78. COGGINS, supra note 9. at 693.
79. Id. at 743.
80. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970). The BLM's study lasted until 1970 when the
CMUA expired.
81. Shannon, supra note 25, at 5.
82. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994)
83. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1988).

84. COGGNS, supra note 9, at 711.
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FLPMA gives the BLM permanent authority to manage lands for
multiple uses' and calls for permanent retention of public lands by the
federal government.' FLPMA requires the BLM to develop land use
plans' using a multiple use and sustained yield perspective, considering
environmental concerns and weighing long-term and short-term benefits
of land uses.' PRIA establishes a policy to "manage, maintain and improve" rangeland conditions so that the lands will become as productive
as possible for all rangeland uses, 9 including livestock forage, wildlife
habitat, recreation, and water and soil conservation." FLPMA gives the
BLM and the Forest Service power to reduce livestock levels on grazing
allotments.91 PRIA provides the BLM authority to discontinue grazing in
selected areas.'
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 3 of 1969, as interpreted in NRDC v. Morton, 94 requires both national and regional environmental impact analyses for grazing planning. In Morton, the court held
that a national, programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) considering general policy guidelines was not enough; NEPA required analysis of specific impacts of grazing permits, which vary region to region because of geography, climate and history.'
While the success of NEPA, FLPMA and PRIA in balancing
multiple uses is arguable, 96 they have helped improve the ecological
integrity of the public range. Judicial review under FLPMA has ratified agency power to reduce grazing. 97 However, courts have also
given great deference to agencies' decisions with regard to planning
and setting grazing levels. 98 The statutes require extensive planning by

85.

43 U.S.C. § 1732.

86. Id. § 1701(a).
87. Id. § 1712(a).

88. Id. § 1712(c).
89. Id. § 1901(b)(2).
90. Id. § 1901(a)(1).
91.

Id. §§ 1752(a), (e).

92. Id. § 1903(b).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
94. 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
95. Id. at 838-39, 841. Nevertheless, the court gave the BLM discretion in deciding the scope

of the regional EISs. Id.
96. See generally Blumm, supra note 5.
97. In Schwenke v. Secretary ofInterior, 720 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1983), the court ordered the
transfer of a game refuge from BLM control to the control of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
and directed the FWS to manage the refuge consistent with the refuge's management act, which
would lead to less grazing. Shannon, supra note 25, at 6-7.
98. N1DC v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985), aff'd 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987). The
district court held that FLPMA and PRIA have the "broadest sorts of discretionary language." Id. at 1062.
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government officials with the goal of producing a rational public lands
policy, but a lack of coherence remains in federal grazing policy, due
to a lack in central coordination, changes in policy by different administrations, and opposition to regulation among western ranchers. 99
While planning for multiple uses has led to more forage for wild horses and wildlife, and to greater attention to watershed and recreation
needs, '00 inertia and a lack of money have prevented many large permanent reductions in grazing levels.'"' Lingering problems with damaged and overgrazed land have led to continuing calls from government agencies, scientists and environmental advocacy groups for
changes in the management of public lands grazing.

III. CALLS FOR REFORM AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
RESPONSE

A.

Callsfor Reform

Despite the increased regulatory power of the BLM and the Forest
Service, grazing is still damaging to federal lands, according to many
observers. Since 1988, the General Accounting Office of the federal
government has issued several reports arguing that public lands grazing is
damaging riparian areas, deserts, and wildlife due to management that
neglects wildlife values and emphasizes commodity production." ° In
1989, The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) and the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) reported that public lands grazing is hurting
wildlife and soil and water quality."'° The NWF later reported that the
99. COGGINS, supra note 9, at 694, 743.

100. Shannon, supra note 25, at 7.
101. Joseph M. Feller, What Is Wrong with the BLM's Management of Livestock Grazing on the
PublicLands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 576 (1994). According to Professor Feller, the BLM's recent

policy has been that not to reduce grazing levels unless it has several years of solid data establishing a
need for a reduction. Therefore, if the agency lacks money to do adequate research, reductions will
not occur. Professor Feller also wrote that the BLM generally designs plans to protect or enhance

environmental resources so as to accommodate current levels of livestock. Id. at 577.
Tim Salt, Senior Rangeland Management Specialist for the BLM, said that with the new
regulations, BLM personnel have more flexibility as far as what type of information will be sufficient
to allow reductions in grazing levels. Telephone Interview with Tim Salt, Senior Rangeland Manage-

ment Specialist, Bureau of Land Management (Jan. 24, 1997).

102. See generalgyGENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CURRENT FORMULA KEEPS GRAZING FEES LOW
(1991); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. PUBuC RANGELANDS: SOME RIPARIAN AREAS RESTORED BUT
WIDESPREAD IMPROVEMENT WILL BE SLOW (1988) [hereinaftr SOME RIPARIAN AREAS RESTORED]; GEN-

ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: BLM's HOT DEsERTGRAZING PROGRAM MERITS
RECONSIDERATION (1991); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: INTERIOR'S MON-

ITORING HAS FALLEN SHORT OF AGENCY REQUIREMENTS (1992); and GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED ON DECLINING AND OVERSTOCKED GRAZING AL-

LOTMENTS (1988) [hereinafter MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED].
103.

See generally J. WALD AND D. ALBERSWERTH, OUR AILING PUBLIC RANGELANDS: STILL
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number of endangered, threatened, and candidate species on BLM land
has increased greatly in recent years: seventy-five species were on the
threatened or endangered list for BLM land in 1982, but in 1993 the
number was 216, with 1100 other candidate species."
The NWF/NRDC report also claimed that, in 1989, 97 million acres
of BLM land, or 68.4 percent of BLM land for which data was available,
were in unsatisfactory condition."° Four years earlier, High Country
News reported that, in 1985, 83 percent of the BLM's land was in fair to
poor condition." ° In 1988, the GAO acknowledged that overgrazing
threatened one-fifth of federal grazing allotments with ecological damage' 07 and that overgrazing was damaging 8 percent of grazing allotments,
but that officials were not responding to the problem in 75 percent of
these cases.' 08
Even though many federal lands are worn-out and ecologicallythreatened from excessive grazing, they produce only a small portion
of the nation's livestock. By most measures, western livestock grazing
is not nearly as efficient or productive as eastern livestock operations.
In 1980, U.S. farmers and ranchers were raising an estimated 120
million cattle, but only 1.5 million of them grazed on public land in
the eleven western states. 0 9 The eleven western states provided an
estimated 18 percent of the nation's beef in 1980, mostly due to private irrigation, but Forest Service and BLM grazing land provided
only 2.3 percent of total beef." 10 These western states have 11 percent
of all livestock producers, 9 percent on private land alone, and only
1.5 percent using private and federal lands."' In those eleven states a

AILING, CONDITION REPORT-1989 (1989).

104. JOHN HORNING, GRAZING To EXTINCTION: ENDANGERED, THREATENED AND CANDIDATE
SPECIES IMPERILED BY LIVESrOCK GRAZING ON WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS 2 (1994).

105. Id. at 3.

106. Steve Johnson, BLM's Grazing Program is a National Scandal, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Dec. 23, 1985, at 15. The distinction between "unsatisfactory" and "fair" or "poor" is not clear. The
Draft EIS explained that "[ilnterpreting rangeland conditions has always been controversial." BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, RANGELAND REFORM '94: DRAFT

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 25 (1994). [hereinafter DRAFT EIS]
107. See MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED, supra note 102, at 30. The GAO measured range condition
by comparing present plant communities on allotments with what natural undisturbed communities
would look like. The more similar the present condition is to the natural condition, the better the
rating for the allotment. Id. at 20, 22.
108. Id. at 3. The main reason for inaction was lack of information. Id. at 28; see also supra
note 101.
109. Johnson, supra note 106, at 15. The II western states are Washington, Oregon, California,
Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Utah, New Mexico, Montana, Wyoming, and Colorado.
110. Id. . While the BLM's land covers 11 states, the Forest Service's land covers 46 states.
111. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 25. Estimates for the number of federal permittees ranges from
23,000 (Id.) to 28,000; Joy Belsky, Natural Resource Colloquium, Northwestern School of Law,
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rancher needs an estimated 168 acres
of land to raise one cow, which
2
is nine times the national average."
Notwithstanding the numerous reports of continuing degradation on
public grazing land, in 1988, the GAO argued that improvement has
occurred since the passage of the TGA, and that more improvement is
possible if the BLM and Forest Service can overcome budget cuts and
institutional gridlock." 3 The government achieved dramatic improvements
in some riparian areas, but such programs need monetary and agency
support. " 4 The Clinton Administration intended to provide that additional
support when it came to power in 1993.
B. Clinton Administration Plans
While governor of Arizona, Bruce Babbitt, now Secretary of the
Interior, called for a "new western land ethic" which would replace the
concept of multiple use with public use." 5 Babbitt explained that, with an
increasingly urban population, "we must recognize the new reality that
the highest and best, most productive use of western public land will
usually be for public purposes-watershed, wildlife and recreation."" 6 He
said that the government would need to subordinate its subsidy to traditional uses such as grazing to the need for regeneration and restoration of
public grasslands: "The great urban centers of the west are filled with
citizens who yearn for solitude, for camping facilities, for a blank spot on
the map, a place to teach a son or daughter to hunt, fish or simply survive and enjoy."" 7
As Secretary of Interior, Babbitt renewed his call for improved
stewardship of public lands, but said he was not as concerned with raising
grazing fees to make money for the government." 8 Babbitt explained that
his goals in studying grazing and proposing reforms were as follows:
January 31, 1995. The remaining one-half percent of permittees use state-owned lands in combination

with private and/or federal land.
112. Johnson, supra note 106, at 15. In addition, U.S. consumption of beef, lamb and mutton
has declined steadily since 1970. In 1970 the per capita consumption was 83.7 pounds. By 1993 it
was 63.3 pounds. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 147

(1995). Nevertheless, production of beef, lamb and mutton showed a slight increase during the same
period (going from 22,361 animals in 1970 to 23,671 in 1993), with producers exporting much more
meat to compensate for the decreased U.S. demand: exports went from 176 million pounds in 1980 to
1.28 billion pounds in 1993. Id. at 690.
113.
114.
115.
116.

SOME RIPARIjAN AREAS REsToRED, supra note 102, at 3-4.
Id. at 2-3.
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 1080.
Id.

117. Id. at 1081.
118. Babbitt: High Fees, supra note 8, at 1.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol32/iss2/13

14

Arruda and Watson: The Rise and Fall of Grazing Reform
1997

FIFTY YEARS OF THE BLM

1) to raise public awareness of public lands grazing;
2) to focus on recovery of riparian areas, since they are the key
to water supplies and wildlife survival and because a 1990 Environmental Protection Agency study said riparian areas were at
their worst point in history;
3) to set specific guidelines to give certainty to all involved;
4) to clarify ownership of water rights on BLM lands;
5) to achieve fairer and more effective enforcement of regulations
through streamlining;
6) to raise grazing permit fees to get fair value for use of the
land;
7) to reform grazing without significant harm to ranchers, their
communities, and open space; and
8) to obtain more local participation in land use decisions." 9
With these ideas and goals, Babbitt headed the Clinton
Administration's efforts to change public lands grazing. Babbitt's specific
goals, however, do not seem to intend to subordinate grazing to other
interests. Although the goals aimed to restore damaged lands and reflected
Babbitt's earlier vision of a new western land ethic, they do not fully
embrace that ethic because they do not clearly intend to make public
purposes other than grazing dominant on the public lands. Babbitt seemed
to envision the land, as Leopold did, as an interconnected whole, but his
reforms were unable to question the dominance of grazing. 120 For example, the final reforms will continue to subsidize grazing on federal land.'
The proposed rules just try to improve management so as to allow grazing
to continue on more or less the same scale as today. Babbitt basically said
as much when he told Congress that he felt good ranchers are a key to
maintaining good range condition, and that when ranchers go bankrupt,
the environment suffers. " Nevertheless, the Administration was able to
propose reforms that, if kept intact, would have greatly changed public
lands grazing. Proposing reforms is very different, however, from implementing them.

119. Bruce Babbitt, Babbitt: Beyond Grazing Reform, ROLL CALL, April 11, 1994 [hereinafter

Babbit. Beyond Grazing].
120. For additional comment on this issue, see Joseph M. Feller, "711 the Cows Come Home:
The Fatal Flaw in the Clinton Administration'sPublic Lands Grazing Policy, 25 ENVrL. L. 703, 712
-14 (1995).
121. Karl Hess, Jr. and Jerry L. Holechek, Babbitt's Range Plan Continues Subsidies, Hinders

Real Reform, SACRAMENTO BEE. September 3, 1994, at B7.
122. See Babbitt: High Fees, supra note 8, at 2.
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EVOLUTION OF REFORM EFFORTS

A. Legislative Attempts
Initially, the Administration tried to reform grazing legislatively.
The 1993 budget would have raised the base grazing fee of $1.86 per
AUM by as much as one-third. 123 Babbitt hoped to use an incentive-

based system to lower these higher fees for ranchers using good management practices. 2 4 At the same time, some members of Congress
were attempting to pass more sweeping reforms. 125 These efforts
suffered a fatal blow, however, when western Senators pressured
Clinton to back away from raising fees.' 26 Although for a time Congress had some hope of a compromise, procedural gridlock eventually
froze the legislative process. 127 However, another avenue for reform
remained and, by the middle of March 1993, the Administration was
considering an administrative approach to grazing reform to bypass
Congressional reluctance. 128
B. Administrative Attempts: Rangeland Reform '94
With legislative reforms foundering, the Administration pushed
forward with its attempts to reform grazing by preparing new regulations
for the BLM and the Forest Service. In August 1993, the BLM and the
Forest Service outlined their proposed reforms in Advanced Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking (1993 notice), 29 initiating a grazing reform effort

123. GAO Eyes Money from Commodities, Warns on More Wilderness, PUB. LANDS NEws, Jan.
21, 1993, at 7.
124. See Babbitt: High Fees, supra note 8, at 1.
125. Boxscore ofLegislation, PUB. LANDS NEWS, May 13, 1993, at 10. Senator Harry Reid (DNev.), Representative George Miller (D-Cal.), Rep. Bruce Vento (D-Minn.), and Rep. Mike Synar
(D-Okla.) were the most active proponents of reform. Reid, FriendsAttack Babbitt Range Plan; Just
Positioning?, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Mar. 17, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Reid, Friends].
126. HORNING, supra note 104, at 4.
127. Babbitt, Hill Dems Agree on Grazing Fees, Range Policy, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Oct. 14,
1993, at 1; Senate Refuses to Consider Range Policy-Thus Far, PuB. LANDS NEws, Oct. 28, 1993,
at I [hereinafter Senate Refuses]. The doomed compromise would have resulted in a smaller fee increase than the one Babbitt had proposed, and would have codified roughly two-thirds of Babbitt's
policy proposals, including the elimination of rancher-dominated Grazing Advisory Boards (GABs),
and imposed limits on rancher ownership of future range improvements and water rights. See Babbitt,
Hill Dents Agree on Grazing Fees, Range Policy, supra at 1-2.
128. Babbitt Takes Grazing Fee Hike on Road; Does He Need Hill?, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Mar.
18, 1993, at 4.
129. BLM Grazing Administration Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg.
43,208 (1993) [hereinafter BLM Announcement]; Forest Service, Grazing and Livestock Use and
Grazing Fees Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,202 (1993) [hereinafter
Forest Service Announcement].
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entitled "Rangeland Reform '94." 3 After receiving over 12,000 comments and holding public meetings across the West,' the BLM and the
Forest Service issued revised proposed rules in March and April 1994
(1994 proposal), respectively, and a joint draft Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) in May 1994."1 Then, after another 20,000 comments
and forty-nine additional public meetings, the agencies issued their final
EIS in December 1994 in anticipation of the publication of final rules.
The final rules were published in February 1995 and took effect August
21, 1995."3 As the various stages of this process progressed, many revisions occurred, reflecting considerable influence by ranching interests and
resulting in numerous changes to the reforms, most of which weakened
the proposals.' 35 An analysis of the major components of the reform
shows how it evolved in response to public pressure.
1. Goals:
The Administration's announced goals were similar to Babbitt's

earlier goals. 3 6 The stated intent of the changes proposed in the 1993
notice was 1) to improve administration of grazing permits and leases, 2)
to place greater emphasis on stewardship of the rangelands, 3) to obtain
fair and reasonable compensation for the grazing of public lands, and 4)
to manage the rangelands using an ecological approach.' 37 The Forest
Service defined "ecological approach" as providing for multiple uses
while managing lands to achieve a diverse, healthy, productive, and
sustainable ecosystem. 3 ' The BLM expressed a similar ambition, couching its version of an ecological approach in terms of "ecosystem management," defined as "managing ecosystems to produce, restore, or sustain
130. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,208; Forest Service Announcement supranote
129, at 43,202.
131. DRAFIT EIS, supra note 106, at 5-2 to 5-3.
132. BLM Grazing Administration Proposed Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,314 (1994) [hereinafter
BLM Proposed Rules]; Forest Service Proposed Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,074 (1994) [hereinafter
Forest Service Proposed Rules]; See DRAFT EIS, supra note 106.
133.

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

RANGELAND

REFORM 194: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 40 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL EIS].

134. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13.
135. See Reid, Friends, supra note 125, at 2.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
137. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,208. Another common goal was to achieve
greater consistency between the BLM and Forest Service regulations. The Forest Service included
similar goals, including the additional explicit intention to change the system used to determine the
fees for grazing of privately owned livestock on national forest lands. Forest Service Announcement,
supra note 129, at 43,202.
138. Id. The Forest Service also noted that, because of greater demands from users of the public
lands, other interests besides grazing also needed attention. Id. at 43,205.
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ecosystem integrity and desired conditions, uses, products, values and
services over the long term.'9 Although the agencies maintained these
goals throughout the reform process, emphasis on the desire to reform
grazing without adversely impacting grazing-dependent communities
increased.'14
2. Money and Property:
One of the major focuses of the Administration's reform plan was to
obtain a "fair return for the private use of publicly owned resources."41
The agencies believed that the government was not getting a "fair return"
because of problems associated with grazing fees, subleasing arrangements, and range improvements by permittees. The agencies proposed to
solve these problems by raising grazing fees for ranchers and by being
more assertive landlords in the areas of subleasing and improvements. 4 2
This policy reprised Pinchot's original view that those who take public
resources should pay "reasonable compensation." 4 3
a. Grazing Fees
The agencies believed that a fundamental problem existed with the
present grazing fee system: a wide disparity between rates charged for
grazing on private and on federal lands.'" In an attempt to narrow this
disparity, the agencies proposed a formula that included a base value' 4
that considered the cost differences of operating on public lands as compared to private lands. Additionally, to better approximate market conditions, this base value would be adjusted annually in proportion to changes
in private grazing land lease rates." Using the base value suggested in
the 1993 notice, the price that ranchers would pay per AUM would have
risen from $1.86 to $3.96 over three years. 47 Although this base value

139. Id.
140. DRAFT EIS, supra note 106, at 6.
141. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,204.
142. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,211-12.
143. See VOIGT, supra note 17, at 48; VoIG'T supra note 61 and accompanying text.
144. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,209. The grazing fee reforms proposed by
BLM and the Forest Service were essentially identical. Id.
145. Forest Service Proposed Grazing Fees, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,094, 22,095 (1994) thereinafter
Forest Service Fees]. Base value is a minimum charge assessed for each animal unit month (AUM)
the permittee receives for a given year. Id.
146. BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,316. This adjustment would be made by
multiplying the base value by the "forage index value," which represents the yearly change in the
private lease rate in the 17 western states. Id.
147. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,210. Future fee increases, in any one year,
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would still have been substantially below market rates," Babbitt was
satisfied because it reduced the disparity between private and public land
lease rates while also reflecting the fact that public rangelands are less
productive, and therefore should be less expensive, than private lands. 49
In addition to charging fees that approximated market rates, Babbitt wanted to encourage stewardship by imposing higher fees on those permittees
who did not take care of their grazing allotments.' Thus, the proposed
who
rules provided a 30 percent reduction in the grazing fee for ranchers
1 51
met certain criteria, which were to be set forth in a separate rule.
The fee provision was one of the most controversial provisions of
Rangeland Reform '94 from the beginning and generated extensive public
comment, most of which focused either on the economic impacts of an
increased fee or on the calculation of the fee formula. 5 2 In January 1995,
in response to these comments and perhaps daunted by the prospect of a
Republican Congress (after the November 1994 election), the Administration decided to cancel the fee hike proposal and let Congress deal with the
issue if it desired. 53 Consequently, the Administration eliminated the
grazing fee increase and the incentive-based fee proposal from the final
version of the new rules.154
b. Subleasing
One of the prerequisites to obtaining a grazing permit is that the
applicant must own property to which the federal grazing authorization is
attached. 5 5 This private property is referred to as base property. Prior to
Rangeland Reform '94, the BLM authorized its permittees,156 free of
could not exceed 25% of the amount charged the previous year. Id.
148. See Tom Kenworthy, Proposalto Raise GrazingFees Is Sinking Slowly in the West, THE

WASH. POST, January 19, 1995, at A23. In the western 11 states, private grazing rates increased 33%
from 1980 to 1993, from $7.53 per AUM to $10.03. Current rates for state lands range from $3 per
AUM in Wyoming to $7.34 in Washington. Id.

149. Babbitt Seeks Tough New Range Standards, Higher Fees, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Aug. 19,
1993, at 3.
150. See Babbitt: High Fees, supra note 8, at 1.
151.

BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,316-17. These criteria would focus on range-

land improvement programs characterized by best management practices, the furtherance of resource
condition objectives, and comprehensive monitoring. Id. at 14,317.
152. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,899.
153. Babbitt Tosses Grazing Fee Hot Potato to Hill; Keeps Rest, PUB. LANDS NEws, Jan. 5,
1995, at 2.

154. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,899.
155. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,212.
156. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 15. In contrast to the BLM, the Forest Service currently
does not allow subleasing or management of other's livestock on national forest grazing allotments in
western states. Id. While the Forest Service proposed to allow permittees to manage other private
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charge, to either 1) lease this base property to another private party and
transfer, with BLM approval, the federal grazing permit to the other party
(a base property lease) or 2) allow the permittee to manage another private party's livestock on the permittee's grazing allotment (a management
lease)." 7 The proposed rules would have made both practices subject to a
surcharge.. 8 The administration justified this surcharge on the ground that
it would allow the public to get its "fair share" of some 5of
the profits
9
ranchers get from subletting their subsidized grazing rights.1
The BLM's final rules, however, revised both of these proposed
surcharge provisions. First, the surcharge on base property leases was
eliminated altogether.' 6" This change was a compromise to ranchers concerned that because people often enter the ranching business by subleasing
ranches, a surcharge on this practice would make becoming a rancher too
expensive.' 6 Second, while the surcharge on management leases survived,
the final rules made it adjustable to market rates. 62 Thus, instead of being
charged an additional fifty percent of the grazing fee, permittees who
manage others' livestock on their federal grazing allotments will be
charged thirty-five percent of the difference between the federal grazing
fee and the private lease rate for the appropriate state. 63 The BLM believed that this surcharge would satisfy Babbitt's intent to establish a fair
and reasonable return to the public because it allowed the BLM to recover
its "landlord's share" of the proceeds from these private transactions that
involve public resources."

parties' livestock on their allotments, this proposal was eventually dropped. See infra section
IV(B)(4).
157. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,212.
158. Id. Ranchers that leased base property and transferred their permits would have been
charged an additional 20% of their grazing fees, and ranchers that managed unowned livestock would
have been charged an additional 50%. id.
159. Id. Many comments stressed that children of ranchers often have their own livestock for
educational projects or in anticipation of taking over their parents' operation and that such situations
should not be subject to a surcharge. The BLM responded in the 1994 proposal by exempting from
these surcharge provisions permittees who make base property and management leases with their sons
and daughters. The BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,323; DRAFr EIS, supra note 106, at
2-13.
160. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,900.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol32/iss2/13

20

Arruda and Watson: The Rise and Fall of Grazing Reform
1997

FIFTY YEARS OF THE BLM

c. Range Improvements and Water Rights
Rangeland Reform '94 proposed changes regarding title to certain improvements made by permittees, water rights for grazing on public lands, and
the way range improvement funds were spent. The final rules adopted proposals that allow the federal government to assert title to all new permanent
improvements on grazing allotments."6 If a rancher's lease to an allotment is
canceled, the government will compensate the rancher for money it had spent
on any permanent improvement to the federal allotment."s Because this provision is prospective only, any valid existing rights to permanent improvements,
and compensation for them, remain unaffected. 67 Similarly, the government
will, under state law, acquire, maintain, and administer all new water rights
obtained on public land for purposes of livestock grazing on those lands."'
This provision also applies only prospectively; therefore, the rule will not
affect existing water rights, nor will it create any new federal reserved water
rights.'6 In addition, the rule will not affect water rights for uses other than
livestock grazing on public lands, such as irrigation, municipal, or industrial
uses. 170

Another aspect of the changes made in this area regarded the dispersement of range improvement funds. The BLM's Range Improvement
Fund and the Forest Service's Range Betterment Fund consist of a portion
of grazing fee receipts that are put toward range improvement programs.
Prior to the reform, the BLM's policy was to return all range improvement funds to the same districts from where they came, without
prioritizing on the basis of need.' The BLM believed that this system
was not in the best interests of the public because it prevented funds from
being sent to places where they might be needed most." Under the final
rules, 50 percent of these funds will be distributed to the state or local

165.

Id. at 9,897. Title to temporary or removable improvements will remain with the permit-

tee. Id. Temporary improvements include livestock handling facilities, such as corrals, creep feeders,
loading chutes, and troughs for hauled water. BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,322. The
legality of this new regulation is undecided at the time of this writing. See infra note 297.
166. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,897. The permittee is entitled to compensation under
section 402(g) of FLPMA, which provides compensation for a penmittee's authorized permanent
improvements whenever a permit is canceled to devote the land to another purpose. 43 U.S.C. §
1752(g) (1994).
167. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,897. This provision was designed to make BLM

policy on water rights consistent with ELM policy prior to the 1980's and with that of the Forest
Service. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,333.

172. Id.
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district (or forest) from which the funds originated, and the other 50
percent will be distributed on a priority basis." 3 These rules assure that at
least half of the improvement funds generated by grazing will be distributed on a priority basis. 74

3. Stewardship:
Many of the proposals in the 1993 notice arose from the
Administration's concern about the health of public grazing lands and the
resources of which they are comprised. The Forest Service's 1990 report,
The Forest Service Program for Forest and Rangeland Resources, found that
27 percent of national forest rangelands were classified as "in unsatisfactory
condition."'" This report persuaded the Forest Service to commit to improving on-the-ground rangeland conditions.' 76 Likewise, in 1991, the BLM's
National Public Lands Advisory Council, reporting on methods to improve
rangeland management, stressed that the basic components of soil, water and
vegetation should be the BLM's "primary concern" in attempting to effectuate ecosystem management, since, as the Council put it, "without assurances
for the future well-being of these basic natural resources, there is precious
little to squabble about."'" In response to the Administration's goal of protecting the lands themselves, the agencies proposed several reforms to encourage ranchers to take better care of the lands they lease. Among the
reform proposals were term-length reductions, disqualification, or loss of
preference rights for ranchers who violate permit conditions or fail to meet
resource condition objectives; allowances for extended "nonuse" of lands for
conservation purposes; and a set of national standards and guidelines for
ecosystem conditions and rangeland management.
a. Tenure
In the 1993 notice, the agencies suggested making the length of a grazing permit contingent upon ranchers' compliance with the terms and conditions of their permits and demonstrated stewardship.' Under this proposal, a
173. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,936.
174. Id. Range improvement funds would be spent not only on improvements and planning for
grazing, but also monitoring ecosystem health, engineering, and environmental assessments. DRAFT
EIS, supra note 106, at 12, 14, GL-16. This is in keeping with the spirit of FLPMA, which states
that the purpose of the fund is to pay for improvements that can "arrest ...continuing deterioration"
of rangelands and, therefore, benefit wildlife, watershed protection, and livestock production. 43
U.S.C. § 1751(b)(1) (1994).
175. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,202.
176. Id.
177. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,208.
178. ld. at43,211.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol32/iss2/13

22

Arruda and Watson: The Rise and Fall of Grazing Reform
1997

FIFTY YEARS OF THE BLM

rancher seeking to renew a grazing permit would receive the standard tenyear permit only if he was in "substantial compliance" with all permit terms
and conditions, and if his part of the range was "moving toward or maintaining desired ecological conditions." 79 If, however, the rancher was in "substantial compliance" with all permit terms and conditions, but was "failing to
make significant progress toward resource condition objectives," a five-year
permit would be issued."te This five-year permit would have effectively
created a probationary period, during which the rancher could show compliance with permit terms and conditions and resource objectives.' New
permittees, who may or may not have had a record of compliance, would
have automatically received the five-year permit, giving them an opportunity
to prove their ability to be good stewards."u
These permit tenure proposals were not carried forward in the 1994
proposal.183 The agencies decided, based on public comments, but without
any explanation,' 1" that the threat of shorter tenures for poor performance and
the opportunity for longer tenures for good stewards would not necessarily
encourage good stewardship and would unfairly penalize new operators."a5
Thus, the agencies retreated from their proposals and decided to continue
issuing permits for ten years." 6 Consequently, the final rules contain no discussion of limiting permit tenure on the basis of stewardship.
b. ProhibitedActs and Disqualification
Another of the Administration's methods to encourage ranchers to
become good stewards of their grazing allotments was to consider a permit applicant's history for performance before granting new or renewed
permits. The agencies first aimed to clarify the definition of a "prohibited
act," so that ranchers would know what laws they must obey to maintain
grazing permits. '" Under the final rules, a violation of any federal or
state conservation or resource protection law will be deemed a "prohibited
act" that, as with violations of grazing permit terms and conditions, could
lead to cancellation or suspension of a federal permit if the violation

179. Id. Although the BLM's trcatment of the subject was more detailed, both agencies had substantially the same tenure proposals. See Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,203.
180. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,211.
181. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,203.
182. Id.
183. BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,322, 14,334.

184. Id. The agencies accepted, apparently on faith, the view of commentors that shorter tenure
"would not contribute to the goals of improved rangeland health." Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,211.
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involves public land.s Further, any violation that resulted in a cancellation of a federal permit will automatically bar the violator for three years
from receiving new or additional federal grazing permits."l Similar violations, however, will not necessarily disqualify the violator from renewing
existing permits." ° The BLM justified reviewing the applicant's compliance history on the ground that the public reasonably expects permittees
on public grazing lands to take care of those lands."'9 Thus, where permit
applicants are found to be in violation of environmental laws or permit
conditions, and therefore not exercising care for public lands, the BLM
will be more selective in granting permits to those applicants.
c. Permitted Use and Preferencesfor Renewal
Prior to the reform, the BLM defined a permittee's grazing "preference" as a specified number of AUMs of forage to which a particular
permittee would be entitled.'92 The Forest Service, however, defined a
"preference" as merely a permittee's priority to obtain or hold a grazing
permit." Under the Forest Service's approach, a permittee's number of
AUMs represented his "permitted use," not his "preference. " '9 In the
final rules, the BLM adopted the Forest Service's definition of grazing
.preference. " ' Thus, an applicant who is qualified to obtain a grazing
permit receives a "preference," or priority right (over other applicants),
to a renewal permit when the original permit expires." Under the final

188. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,898. These laws will be listed in the regulations and
include federal or state laws concerning water pollution; predator control activities; application for
storage of pesticides, herbicides, or other hazardous materials; alteration or destruction of natural
stream courses; wildlife destruction; removal or destruction of archeological resources; and violations
of state laws regarding the stray of livestock. Id. This change is simply a return to pre-1984 policy.
BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,211.
189. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,898. Cancellation of a state permit or lease will
disqualify an applicant for a new permit only if the permit was for land within the same federal allotment containing the federal permit at issue. Id. at 9,962.
190. Id. This is a change from the proposed rules, which would have automatically disqualified
applicants for renewal of permits, as well as applicants for new permits. BLM Proposed Rules, supra
note 132, at 14,323. A renewal applicant still must show "substantial compliance" with the terms and
conditions of the permit and with BLM grazing regulations in general. BLM Final Rules, supra note
13, at 9,898. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c) (1994). The final rules give the authorized BLM officer discretion in making this determination. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,898.
191. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,210.
192. Id. at 43,211.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,921.
196. Section 402 of FLPMA requires that existing permit or lease holders be given first priority
for renewal of grazing permits, as long as the holder is in compliance with the Secretary of the
Interior's rules and regulations and the terms and conditions of their permit or lease. 43 U.S.C §
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rules, to hold a preference to receive a renewed permit, a rancher will
have to demonstrate "substantial compliance" with the terms and conditions of his previously held federal or state permits and laws and regulations pertaining to grazing." 9 Therefore, in addition to the potential for
disqualification of new permit applicants because of poor stewardship,'
applicants may also lose "preference" rights for renewed permits if they
are not in compliance with stewardship conditions on their current allotments. The number of AUMs of forage the rancher receives (his "permitted use") will be determined not by his "preference," but by his allowed livestock use, which will be established through a land use plan. 19,
d. Conservation Use
In the final rules, the BLM adopted a provision to allow ranchers to
retain their permits while temporarily not using their land for grazing, but
instead, leaving the land unused, for conservation purposes.'- Previously,
BLM rules allowed this type of nonuse for only one year at a time. 2° ' The
final rules, however, allow conservation use for up to the entire term of a
permit (10 years).' With the expansion of allowable conservation use, the
Administration hoped to improve range conditions by allowing ranchers to
rest their lands.' The final rules further this goal by allowing permittees to
promote resource protection or enhancement (including making progress
toward resource condition objectives) on all or part of their allotments.'

1752(c). Under the final rules, therefore, "preference" defines an applicant's relative standing for the
award of a grazing privilege, as reflected in historic records. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at
9,922.
197. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,921, 9,962. The legality of this change in the regunotes 297 and 304.
lations is undecided at the time of this writing. See infra
198. See supra section IV(B)(3)(b).
199. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,921.

200. Id. at 9,898. Allotments in conservation use would not be subject to grazing fees; however, permittees requesting conservation use would be required to maintain existing improvements on

conservation use allotments so that when the allotment is returned to grazing use, the improvements
would be in working condition. Id.
201.

DRAFt EIS, supra note 106, at 2-15.

202. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,940. This practice is consistent with the Forest
Service's current policy. DRAFT' EIS, supra note 106, at 2-15. One significant limitation on conservation use is that it must conform with applicable land use plans. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at
9,940. BLM's land use plans consider all forms of uses to which permittees may put their grazing
allotments. Such uses include grazing or livestock use, conservation use, nonuse, and temporary suspended use. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,211.
203. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 16.
204. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,898. To assure that the use is consistent with resource management objectives and state or regional standards and guidelines (discussed in the next
section), BLM will monitor allotments placed in conservation use. Id. at 9,939. BLM believed that
monitoring would discourage ranchers from placing land in conservation use for purposes other than
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Moreover, the final rules encourage conservation both by assuring permittees
that they may resume grazing on conservation use allotments in the future
and by not allowing any other permittees to use any forage resulting from
allotments set aside for conservation use.' Finally, the final rules clarify that
conservation use is to be initiated at the request of a permittee; it may not be
imposed on an unwilling permittee.?
e. National Standards and Guidelines
One of the more controversial proposals of Rangeland Reform '94
was the creation of national standards and guidelines for rangeland management. The agencies planned to establish standards and guidelines that
would be used in forming the BLM's land use management plans, the
Forest Service's forest plans, and in establishing permit conditions for
permittees under either agency.' The purpose in creating the standards
and guidelines was to identify conditions that must be met to ensure
healthy, sustainable, and productive ecosystems,) 8 thereby establishing a
benchmark for rangeland protection and reducing ranchers' uncertainty
about what they need to do to be good stewards.'
The final rules adopted national requirements, known as "fundamentals of rangeland health," designed to "address the necessary physical
components of functional watersheds, ecological processes required for
healthy biotic communities, water quality standards and objectives, and
habitat for threatened or endangered species" as they relate to properlyfunctioning rangeland ecosystems. 210 These "fundamentals" are not na-

conservation. Id.
205.

Id. at 9,898.

206. Id. The legality of the new conservation use regulation is undecided at the time of this
writing. See infra notes 297 and 305.
207. The BLM Announcement, supranote 129, at 43,212; Forest Service Announcement, supra
note 128, at 43,203. The Forest Service's discussion of these national standards and guidelines was

quite general, and somewhat vague in detail. While the Service made repeated mention of "standards
and guidelines from forest plans," it never defined what they would entail. It did seem clear, howev-

er, that the Forest Service would implement any such standards as part of the NFMA forest planning
process. See, e.g., Forest Service Proposed Rules, supra note 132. at 22,078. BLM, on the other
hand, covered this topic with much greater specificity and detail; therefore, the following discussion
focuses primarily on the BLM's treatment of the national standards and guidelines.

208. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,212.
209. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,203.
210. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,898. Guiding principles for the "fundamentals" in-

clude factors relating to "watershed function, threatened or endangered species and candidate species,
habitat for native plant and animal populations, water quality, and the distribution of nutrients and
energy flow." Id. at 9,899.
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tional standards and guidelines, but rather, models for developing state or
regional standards and guidelines. 1' These state or regional standards and
guidelines apply directly to permittees through the terms and conditions of
their grazing permits,"' The final rules included a strict timetable for
compliance with the "fundamentals:" state or regional standards and
guidelines will be developed within eighteen months of the effective date
of the final rules."' Moreover, if state or regional standards and guidelines have not been completed within that time, the Secretary of the Interior will impose "fallback" standards and guidelines, which will remain in
effect until state or regional standards and guidelines are completed. 1 4
Because the standards and guidelines (whether state, regional, or fallback)
will be part of a permittee's permit terms and conditions, violations of the
standards and guidelines will subject the permittee to permit modification
or cancellation."' Further, where the BLM determines that existing grazing management practices are failing to meet the standards and guidelines,
the final rules allow the authorized officer to "take appropriate action,"
which could include reducing livestock stocking rates, adjusting the season or duration of livestock use, or modifying or relocating range improvements .216
4. Public Involvement:
One of the central themes of Rangeland '94 was to increase public
involvement in the management of public lands. The BLM, for example,
believed that broader and more effective public involvement was critical

211.

Id. at 9,898. The 1993 notice had envisioned a tiering system, with mandatory national

standards and guidelines and more flexible regional standards and guidelines that could be customized
to fit the needs of particular locales and regions. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,212.
The proposed national standards and guidelines received many comments, most of which either questioned whether a set of "universal" standards could be established and applied to public grazing lands
or suggested that standards and guidelines should only be established at a local level. BLM Proposed

Rules, supra note 128, at 14,325. In response to these comments, BLM dropped the idea of national
standards and guidelines that would apply directly to permittees (through permit conditions), replacing
them with "national requirements" that would be used toprovide guidance for the preparation of state
or regional standards and guidelines. These national requirements became the "fundamentals of rangeland health" in the final rules. Id.

212. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,966.
213. Id. at 9,899.
214. Id. Factors for fallback standards proposed in the 1994 proposal included 1) soil stability

and watershed function; 2) distribution of nutrients and energy; 3) the ability of plant communities to
recover; and 4) indicators of healthy flood plain structure and condition. Id.
215. Any cancellations of state or federal permits within 36 months prior to application will
disqualify an applicant for a new or additional grazing permit. See supra text accompanying notes
187-91.

216. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,899.
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to its move toward implementing ecosystem management.2"7 Babbitt also
believed that public input was necessary, both in managing rangelands
and in the reform effort itself. During the information-gathering process
that preceded Rangeland Reform '94, Babbitt took part in weekly conferences with western ranchers and environmentalists, trying to build a
consensus on range reforms. 8 This focus on public involvement was
reflected in the reform proposals.
a. Resource Advisory Councils
Under the final rules, the BLM is establishing new advisory committees, to be known as "resource advisory councils," that will provide the
agency with advice and recommendations on "the full array of multiple
use issues" associated with public lands.219 These new resource advisory
councils (RACs) replace the Grazing Advisory Boards established under
the TGA.? The grazing boards advised the BLM on management issues
involving limited geographic areas, constrained by administrative boundaries." The BLM believed that a shift to ecosystem management required
committees with more diverse memberships that could advise the management of a broader area, delineated by the "commonalities of the public
land resource.'
Resource advisory councils will consist of ten to fifteen members,
representing a broad range of uses of, and interests in, the public rangelands.' All members of RACs will be required to possess relevant experience or expertise, have a commitment to collaborative effort, and have a
commitment to successful resolution of resource management issues.4
217. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,210.
218.

See Babbitt, Beyond Grazing, supra note 119.

219. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,896. Section 309 of FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to establish advisory committees that conform to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 14). 43 U.S.C. § 1739(a) (1994). Because the Forest Service
did not specifically address formation of RACs, the following discussion focuses entirely on the
BLM's proposals.
220. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,914.
221. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,210.
222. Under the final rules, the geographic jurisdictions of RACs may be based on state, BLM
district, or ecoregion boundaries, depending on the model chosen. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13,
at 9,959-60. Alternative models for RACs are discussed further, below, see infra notes 227-34 and
accompanying text.
223. Id. One-third of the members would represent permittees, commodity industries (such as
mineral and timber), and developed recreational activities; one-third would represent environmental or
resource conservation groups, archeological and historical interests, and dispersed recreational activities; and one-third would represent state, county, or local elected offices, the public at-large, Indian
tribes, natural sciences academia, and state agencies responsible for management of natural resources,
land, or water. Id. at 9,959.
224. Id. at 9,896. With regard to minimum experience and expertise, each member will have to
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Further, to ensure that all members of RACs have a common understanding of the scientific, economic, social, and legal issues involved in managing public lands, all members will be required to attend a training
course in management of rangeland ecosystems.' All of these measures,
diverse membership, training in management issues, and commitment to
collaborative problem-solving are intended to ensure that the RACs will
be balanced and employ a consensus-building approach to developing recommendations for BLM managers.'
In order to provide flexibility in developing a system of RACs, the
final rules offer a choice of three different models.' Models A and B
both incorporate three levels of groups, including mandatory RACs, optional rangeland resource teams and technical review teams created by the
RACs.n Rangeland resource teams will consist of five members: two
resident, permittees, one resident at-large community representative, one
environmental representative, and one wildlife/recreation representative. 9
All members of rangeland resource teams will be required to have knowledge and expertise of the land and communities where they serve. 210 The
RACs may also establish technical review teams to provide local level
advice to the parent RAC on specific factual issues."l Membership of
technical review teams is limited to federal employees and paid consultants, based on their knowledge of resource management or the specific
issues for which the team has been formed." Under model C of the final
rules, neither rangeland resource teams nor technical review teams are
required. Model C requires only an RAC and allows subgroups of "any
be a resident of the state in which the area covered by the RAC is located and will have to have

experience or knowledge of the geographic area within the council's purview. Id.
225. Id.
226. BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,320. While RACs will be strictly advisory in

nature, the final rules include a provision that allows the RAC, when it felt that its recommendations
have been arbitrarily disregarded, to request that the Secretary of the Interior respond to the council's
concerns within 60 days. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,959.
227. Id. Although the 1994 proposal suggested a tiered system involving RACs and two classes
of subgroups (rangeland resource teams and technical review teams), the final rules do not require a
multilevel system. Under the final rules, only the RACs themselves will be required; other subgroups
will be discretionary. Id. at9,915. State Directors of the BLM, in consultation with affected governors and other interested parties (including the public), will decide among the alternative models. Id.
at 9,896-97.
228. Subtle differences regarding geographic area of service, membership, and voting majorities
distinguish these models from one another. Id. at 9,896.

229. Id. at 9,959. Rangeland review teams may be formed by a RAC on its own motion or in
response to a petition by local citizens. Id.
230. Id.
231. Technical review teams may be established by the BLM authorized officer on the BLM's
motion, or in response toa request from the RAC. Id.
232. Id. at 9,959-60.
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type and number."" The BLM intended that the process for establishing
RACs (including selecting a subgroup model) begin prior to the effective
date of the final rules so that the BLM could begin using the RACs for
advice soon after that date.

b. Interested Public
Increasing the number of management positions open to certain
members of the public (through resource advisory councils and subgroups) created "formal" public involvement. In addition, the Administration wanted to allow greater "informal" public participation in the
evaluation of grazing management on public lands."5 Consequently, the
agencies sought to broaden the definition of "interests" affected by grazing decisions and, therefore, able to participate in decision-making. Under
the final rules, for example, the BLM will recognize, as a member of
what the agency now calls the "interested public," any individual, group,
or organization that writes to the agency expressing concern regarding
management of livestock on specific grazing allotments.u 6 In order to
involve as many people as possible in the decision-making process, the
"interested public" will be able to participate in decisions relating to
initial allocations of forage, the development of management plans, renewals of grazing permits, and the placing of terms and conditions on
grazing permits. 7 The final rules also contain requirements for consultation with the "interested public" in various provisions, including those
dealing with permit issuance, renewal and modification, increasing and
decreasing permitted use, and development of activity plans and range
improvement programs.2B
5. Administrative Efficiency:
Several proposals in Rangeland Reform '94 were designed to make
the regulations simpler and more efficient. The agencies' goal was to
"streamline . . . administrative functions."" Reform efforts aimed at

233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 9,896.
Id. at 9,897.
BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,210.
BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9.897.

237.

BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,324. Previously, BLM officers first decided if

a member of the public was a member of an "affected interest" and, thus, qualified to participate in
the grazing decision-making process. The new "interested public" standard eliminates this discretion.
BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,897.
238. Id. at 9,897.
239. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,208.
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increasing agency efficiency included proposals to allow the BLM's field
managers to put certain decisions into effect more quickly, to eliminate
the BLM's concept of "suspended nonuse," and to reduce the Forest
Service's administrative costs by combining two types of short-term permits and increasing the duration of those permits.
a. Implementing Decisions
Prior to the reform, the decisions of BLM field managers were
subject to a thirty-day appeal period.' If a decision was appealed within
that period, the BLM would suspend the decision until it took final action
on the appeal."4 The BLM believed that, in some cases, this automatic
stay of decisions with the filing of an appeal prevented field managers
from taking necessary, responsible action.u 2 Therefore, the BLM allowed
its field managers to override this suspension and place their decisions in
"full force and effect" during the thirty-day appeal period if the decision
involved an "emergency situation."' " The reforms adopted by the final
rules largely attempt to clarify the definition of an "emergency situation."
Thus, the final rules allow decisions that are necessary to prevent damage
to "soil, vegetation, or other resources" to be placed in full force and
effect during the thirty-day appeal period. 2' These decisions will become
effective immediately and will remain in effect unless a stay is granted.' "
The BLM believed that the reforms will allow field managers to react
more appropriately and responsibly to situations that require immediate
action. 2

6

b. Suspended Nonuse
The BLM initiated the concept of "suspended nonuse" in the 1940s
as a method for resting rangelands on which demand had exceeded the

240. A decision of a field manager became effective at the end of the 30-day appeal period if
the decision had not been appealed. Id. at 43,210.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.

243. An "emergency situation" arose when a decision needed to be implemented immediately in
order to stop resource deterioration. Id.
244. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,963. This decision is in the discretion of the field
manager. Id.
245. Id. at 9,898. This is consistent with the BLM's general appeals process, which allows decisions to be put in place unless a stay is granted. Id. at 9,950. The final rules do not take away any
party's ability to file an appeal or request a stay of a decision. Id. In fact, the BLM acknowledged
that the new rule would probably lead to an increase in stay petitions, but concluded that the benefits
of making the grazing appeals process consistent with the general BLM appeals process were more
important. Id.
246. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,210.
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lands' sustainable forage production capacity, known as "carrying capacity." 7 Lands placed in "suspended nonuse" were off limits to grazing;
any forage on these lands was not allocated to any permittee. However,
ranchers' permits and leases often still indicated AUMs of "suspended
nonuse" forage, leading many ranchers to believe that they had a priority
to future forage from the "suspended nonuse" lands once the lands were
able to support grazing again.' This belief may have been well-founded
because the agency originally intended to return the forage to ranchers
when the land recovered.249 However, the BLM's policy has been not to
reallocate this forage for grazing use.' 0 The BLM's inconsistent treatment
of suspended forage created confusion among prospective permittees, realtors, and brokers who deal in ranch properties? 5 ' To put an end to the
intimation that the BLM might someday reallocate this forage to
permittees, and also to reduce administrative costs, the BLM proposed to
eliminate the concept altogether. 2"
In the 1994 proposal, however, the BLM abandoned its plan to abolish the concept of "suspended nonuse." 53 In making this decision, the
agency cited many comments arguing that eliminating the concept would
affect permittees' property rights and financing agreements.' 4 Although
the BLM disagreed with the conclusions reached by these comments, the
agency apparently decided not to contest the issue further. Without much
explanation, the BLM decided that, "given the contentious nature of the
issue and the fact that the Department views the matter as merely an
administrative record-keeping issue," the proposal would not be carried
forward. 55 Consequently, the final rules contain no reference to eliminating the concept of "suspended nonuse."
c. Short-term Permits

247. Id. at 43,213.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250.
251.

Id. at 43,212-13.
Id. at 43,213.

252. Id. at 43,212. Because permittees were not receiving the forage from these lands anyway,
the BLM felt that it did not make sense to keep track of them. Therefore, the BLM proposed to remove references to "suspended nonuse" in permits and leases as they were renewed or transferred.
Id. at 43212-13.

253. The BLM did rename the concept, for clarity purposes, "suspended use." BLM Proposed
Rules, supra note 132, at 14,323.

254. Id. From the view of prospective buyers and lenders, having more AUMs of forage increases the value of a ranch. Therefore, because "suspended" AUMs were still included in permits.
many permittees relied on them in valuing their property for the purposes of sale or loan agreements.
255.

Id.
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Prior to Rangeland Reform '94, the Forest Service issued "temporary grazing permits" for a period of up to one year under certain conditions. 6 These temporary permits effectively allowed livestock grazing
where it normally would not have been permitted. The Forest Service also
issued "livestock use permits," which allowed grazing of unallocated
forage by some livestock for up to one year." Both of these short-term
permits were granted only when excess forage was available and circumstances called for more grazing in an area, such as when an unusually wet
year resulted in extra forage. 8 In order to reduce administrative costs,
the Forest Service wanted to combine these two permit systems, allowing
a single permit that would last up to three years. 9
The 1994 proposal suggested that issuance of these short-term permits would be expressly contingent upon the applicant's good stewardship. If normally ungrazed land or unused forage became temporarily
suitable for grazing, the agency could allocate it, but only to ranchers
In
who have shown an ability to maintain healthy range conditions.'
addition, the 1994 proposal sought to clarify that short-term permits for
temporary grazing would have no priority for renewal."6 Therefore,
short-term allocations would not automatically become renewable AUM
allocations. As indicated above,262 the Forest Service has not yet issued
final rules in this proposal.
6. Administrative Consistency:
One of the original goals of Rangeland Reform '94 was to achieve
increased consistency between the BLM and Forest Service grazing rules
and regulations. 3 The Administration believed that greater consistency
was necessary to simplify the regulations for grazing permittees, many of

256. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,204. These conditions included allowing livestock grazing 1) on allotments in nonuse status, 2) where excess forage is available after
permitted use is achieved, 3) to respond to situations such as drought which affect current permits,
and 4) for other purposes. Id.
257. "Livestock use permits" applied to commercial transportation livestock, livestock trailing
across National Forest System lands, and research livestock. Id.
258. Id. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 144-45. Part of the decision of whether land was suitable for temporary grazing would be whether the allocation is compatible with agency land use plans.
Id. at 145.
259. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,204. The BLM's final rules do not
address the prospect of short-term permits for temporary grazing.
260. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 15-16.
261. Forest Service Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 22,088.
262. See supra note 14.
263. See supra note 137.
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whom have permits under both agencies.2
Under the 1993 notice, in
order to become more consistent with the BLM, the Forest Service would
not have required U.S. citizenship in order to obtain a permit, would
have allowed permittees to manage other permittees' livestock on their
allotments, and would have increased the penalty for willful unauthorized
use of land.2
The Forest Service also proposed to adopt the BLM's
policy of issuing permits to foreign corporations licensed to do business in
the state in which the grazing allotment existed.'
Of these proposals,
only the Forest Service's plan to allow ranchers to manage other
permittees' livestock on their allotments did not survive in the 1994 proposal, 7 but, as indicated above, 6 the Forest Service has yet to issue
final rules on the other proposals.
Similarly, the BLM proposed reforms that would make it more consistent with the Forest Service. The final rules adopted a proposal allowing for non-monetary settlements in cases where unauthorized uses
were unintentional, incidental in nature, caused no resource damage, and
resulted in no substantial forage consumption. 9 In addition, as indicated
above,' 7 the BLM adopted policies consistent with the Forest Service regarding water rights on public rangelands, definitions of grazing "preference," and length of conservation use.

264. BLM Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,209. An estimated 15% of permittees have
both BLM and Forest Service permits.

ACOBS, supra note 34, at 25.

265. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,203-04. Examples of unauthorized
use included having excess numbers of livestock on an allotment or having livestock graze in
nongrazing areas. Under the 1994 proposal, the penalty for a willful unauthorized use would be double the average monthly rate for pasturing livestock on privately-owned, non-irrigated land (based on
rates in the eleven western states, as determined by the Department of Agriculture). The penalty for
repeated willful unauthorized use would be triple that rate. Id. at 43,204.
266. Forest Service Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 22,089. Individual foreign citizens
("aliens") must have petitioned for naturalization before a permit will be granted. However, it appears that a foreign individual may receive a permit through his foreign corporation. Id.
267. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 15.
268. See supra note 14.
269. BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,338; BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at
9,905.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 165-74, 193-99, and 200-06.
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V. EVALUATING THE PROPOSED REFORMS 2 1

A. Overview
From the initial announcements to the final BLM rules, the
agencies' proposals evolved into generally weaker versions. The causes and effects of this weakening are numerous. Essentially, pressure
from western members of Congress and ranching interests convinced
the Administration to moderate its proposals,272 such as narrowing the
surcharge proposal, 273 acquiescing to rancher concerns over "suspended nonuse,"274 and allowing agency guidelines to be developed on the
local level, 2 " where ranchers may have more influence and with the
Forest Service not putting any new rules into effect. Ranchers were
initially willing to agree to some of the proposed rule changes, then
got mobilized as they became more fearful that these changes would
radically alter their way of life.2 76 The final regulations weakened the
271. Other options considered included no action, which would mean keeping the status quo;
management for livestock production, management for environmental enhancement, and no grazing.
DRAFr EIS, supra note 106, at 9-10.

With no action, AUMs would decline from current levels by approximately 5 % in the shortterm (5 years) and 18% in the long-term (20 years) due to current harmful practices that will cause
the government to reduce grazing under current management principles. Id. at 4-19. This option
would result in a loss of jobs ranging from 710 to 1,820 in the short-term, and 2,640 to 3,580 in the
long-term, depending on the fee structure. Id. at 4-32.
The livestock management option would reduce AUMs from current levels by approximately
4% in the short-term (5 years) and 10% in the long-term (20 years). Id. at 4-64. This option would
result ina loss of jobs ranging from 470 to 1.610 in the short-term, and 1,700 to 2,730 in the longterm, depending on the fee structure. Id. at 4-77.
The environmental enhancement option would reduce AUMs from current levels by approximately 50% in the short-term (5 years) and 30% in the long-term (20 years). Id. at 4-84 to 4-85.
This option would result in a loss of jobs ranging from 7,240 to 7,820 in the short-term, and 4,390 to
5,200 in the long-term, depending on the fee structure. Id. at 4-100 to 4-101.
The no grazing option would phase out grazing permits over three years and the government
would manage public lands for other values, such as recreation and wildlife. See FINAL EIS, supra
note 133, at 9. Some grazing would occur to control weeds or stimulate forage for deer. This option
would result in a loss of approximately 18,300 jobs, . 1% of the west's employment. See DRAFr EIS,
supra note 106, at 4-118 to 4-119. This number does not necessarily reflect the entire ranching
industry that uses federal lands. Though many operations would fold, some might continue to operate
with private and state lands.
272. Westerners defeat Babbitt Range Policy-or Do They?, PuB. LANDS NEWS, Nov. 25,
1993, at 3.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 155-64.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 247-55.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 207-16.
276. Cowboys Take New Stand as Troubled Babbitt Range Plan Nears, PUB. LANDS NEWS,
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potential of the reforms to improve the range's condition, even though
the extent of regulatory changes has remained substantial.
While some of the reforms will make grazing regulation more rational and more sensitive to ecosystem needs; in some ways, the proposals
may be no better, and even worse, than no action at all because they
attempt to sustain unsustainable grazing practices.' n By making moderate
changes, the Administration might seem to be making meaningful reforms, but ecological damage will persist.
Promoting public involvement through the regional meetings held during
the reform process, the new advisory councils, and an expanded definition of
"interested public" are positive steps. The reforms recognize that many people use public lands, 8 and that, at approximately 23,000 in number, federal
lands ranchers are a small group. 9 As Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said, "I
like my cowboys. I think the world of them. But there are 20,000 of them in
the entire West, compared to 46.3 million people .... The ranchers do not

have a free hand to all that land anymore. There are competing interests."'
By making the advisory councils flexible in their representation, instead
of having a fixed number from the various interests, local grazing interests
could dominate them and appeal decisions by reform-minded local officials to
the Secretary, swamping him with recommendations and complaints." s However, if the councils do have diverse representation and do consider multiple
interests, they could become useful tools in range protection. The Clinton
Administration intends for this to happen. Its final EIS called for a "broad and
balanced membership" of diverse perspectives and reflective of the general
public so that no interest group can dominate another group.' Why the
Forest Service did not plan to have advisory councils is not clear. If the councils prove successful, the Forest Service should consider establishing them.

Feb. 17, 1994, at 5-6.
277. See Hess & Holechek, supra note 121: "In fact, Babbitt's plan keeps the system afloat in a

sea of burgeoning budgets and swelling subsidies, all geared toward sustaining the unsustainable."
John Cushman, Jr., Administration Gives Up On Raising Grazing Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994,

at B12 (quoting Johanna Wald of the NRDC, "Ithink this is worse than doing nothing. The Secretary
has in essence invited Congress to perpetuate subsidies for welfare cowboys").
278. The BLM recorded over 74 million visitors in 1992, mostly in areas open to grazing. See
DRAFT EIS, supra note 106, at 27,
279. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. These ranchers do have families and employees which raises the number of affected people.
280. See Senate Refuses, supra note 127, at 2.
281. See Reid, Friends, supra note 125, at 3.
282. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 142. Thus far, the RACs have been a success for the BLM.
According to Tim Salt, the BLM had high hopes for the RACs' ability to bring different interests
together, and they have been even more successful at working together as groups than the BLM expected. See Salt, supra note 101.
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B. Money and Property
The Republican takeover of the Congress caused the abandonment of the fee increase, but, it was never Secretary Babbitt's highest

priority. Babbitt seemed to be willing to give up a fee increase in
return for the rest of the reforms. More recently, Babbitt has said
"[g]overnance is about making sensible compromise . . . . We didn't
get the grazing fee, . . . but new environmental regulations are being

implemented across the West quite nicely. "283 This tactical retreat has
helped to save the other reforms, but even this is in doubt as Congress
may attempt in the future to de-fund, suspend, or eliminate the new
regulations, as it tried already.2" 4 An earlier Republican alternative
would have included a small fee increase,28 5 indicating that stricter
283. The Diane Rehm Show (WAMU-FM radio broadcast, February 27, 1997).
A Congressional fee increase is still possible. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (formerly
D, now R-CO) introduced a bill (S. 193) in the 104th Congress that would have increased the base
fee from $1.86 to $2.36 per AUM. This bill had support from ranchers. Campbell Introduces Grazing
Fee Bill Liked by Ranchers. GOP, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Jan. 19, 1995, at 5.
In addition, Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-NY) introduced a bill (H.R. 676) in the 104th Congress
that would have charged fair market value for grazing permits, but would exempt individual ranchers
with less than $50,000 in gross income or corporations with less than $1 million in assets. 19 Percent
Drop in Grazing Fee Not All Good News for Ranchers, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Feb. 2, 1995, at 4. In the
105th Congress, Rep. Nadler has introduced a similar bill (H.R. 547), the Free Market Grazing Fees
Act. As of this writing, Congress has not taken any action on this bill or on another bill which would
affect grazing fees, H.R. 515, the Corporate Welfare Elimination Act, introduced by Rep. Robert
Andrews (D-NJ). (Search of Library of Congress Legislation Tracking database, Feb. 26, 1997.)
284. Telephone Interview with Kelly Johnston, Staff Director, Senate Republican Policy Committee, Nov. 16, 1995; Tom Kenworthy, Ranchers Drive Land Bill Through FriendlierHill, WASH.
POST, July 20, 1995, at A25; Congress Fails to Pass Range Policy; Senate Votes Regs Bar, PUB.
LANDS NEWS, Aug. 17, 1995, at 2-3; Hill GOP Moves on Range Reform on Three Different Fronts,
PUB. LANDS NEWS, Sept. 28, 1995, at 5-6 [hereinafter Hill GOP Moves].
285. Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) sponsored S. 852 in the 104th Congress, which, among
other things, would have limited grazing permits to those engaged in the livestock business, prescribe
civil penalties for failure to make substantial grazing use of an allotment, eliminate NEPA reviews of
individual permits, and establish advisory boards with an emphasis on grazing interests. Senate Panel
Wants to Move Quickly on New Grazing Policy, PUB. LANDS NEWS, July 6, 1995, at 2-4; Karl Hess,
Jr., Grazing at the Public Trough, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1995, at A14. The Senate passed, on Mar.
21, 1996, S. 1459, the Public Rangelands Management Act, which would eliminate the new BLM
rules and introduce substantially the same changes as S. 852. The vote was 51-46. The House did not
pass the bill. Rose Ellen O'Connor, Senate Bill Would Kill Grazing Rules, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Mar. 22, 1996, at BI.
Also during the 104th Congress, Representative Wes Cooley (R-OR) sponsored H.R. 1713,
which was similar to the Senate bills. See Hill GOP Moves, supra note 284, at 5-6. The bills would
have applied to both the BLM and the Forest Service. See Johnston, supra note 284.
The BLM expects the 105th Congress to attempt some modification of the grazing regulations once again. See Salt, supra note 101. In addition, rancher organizations filed suit against the
government, claiming violations of the TGA, FLPMA, PRIA and NEPA. On October 2, 1995, they
asked for summary judgment against the government. Ranchers Ask Court to Stop RangelandReform.
PR Newswire, July 27, 1995; Ranchers Pursue All Options; Ask Court to Stop BLM Range Plan,

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1997

37

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 32 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 13

Vol. XXXII

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

regulations worry rancher interests more than a higher fee.
Subsidizing grazing doesn't make economical or ecological sense. In
the eastern U.S., the Forest Service uses competitive bidding to issue
grazing permits.' This approach, which would result in market value
rates for government land, seems worth trying in the West, at least in
some areas, as an experiment. Bidding would avoid an across-the-board
fee increase that could be unfair to ranchers who lease marginal land. If
federal land is less valuable than private land, the final bid price would
reflect that. As the final EIS stated, "[ciompetitive bidding would give the
best indication of the market value of federal forage

.

."'

The final

EIS, although acknowledging the success of bidding in the eastern national forests and on Montana's state lands, failed to explain why it was not
adopted for the West." The report did state that bidding might not be
feasible for federal tracts landlocked by private lands, but also stated that
bidding is probably feasible for lands that do not have a grazing preference, such as lands acquired by purchase or exchange. 2 Competitive
bidding is a sound, proven system that would provide a fair return to the
government and- would alleviate ranchers' fears of excessive prices for
marginal land.
As long as the government continues to spend more than it collects
on rangelands, it should spend that money to promote ecosystem protection. 290 Because subsidizing actions which damage the public lands, then
spending money to restore those lands and the species that depend on
them costs taxpayers twice-first to damage the environment, then to fix
it. In addition to allowing extended nonuse of grazing allotments for
conservation purposes, the government should consider subsidizing such
nonuse and other good stewardship practices, in the same way that farm
subsidies used to pay farmers not to grow certain crops to support prices
and protect soil.29'
PuB. LANDS NEWS, Oct. 12, 1995, at 4-5. See also infra note 297.
286. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 107-08.

287. Id. at 108.
288. Id.
289. Id. The Draft EIS stated that legislative changes might be needed to implement bidding
everywhere because it would eliminate or at least modify the TGA's grazing preferences for adjacent

properties. See DRAFr EIS, supra note 106, at 2-40.
290. Such a program could even include private ranchers who do not have permits.
291. The subsidies were provided by various sections of the Agriculture Adjustment Act of
1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1994) and the Agriculture Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. § 1421 (1994). The Agriculture Market Transition Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Slat. 888., signed by President Bill

Clinton on April 4, 1996, will phase out the subsidies for many crops over the next seven years with
declining levels of payments to farmers. If Congress does not take action to continue the new system
after the seven year period, the old subsidy system will return. William Neikirk, So Long Subsidies;
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The surcharges for subleasing and livestock management were mainly money-raising proposals. The weakening of this measure does not
affect ecosystem protection much because charging a fee would not help
the environment, only the federal treasury. The goal, according to the
BLM, was to collect a fair "landlord's share" from ranchers who profit
from subleasing and livestock management. 2' The BLM did not intend to
use the fee to discourage any environmentally damaging practices. The
Forest Service's decision to continue not allowing any management of
others' livestock2 93 prevents ranchers from having short-term flexibility to
adjust livestock numbers in response to changes in forage conditions and
requires the Service to expend time and money enforcing the rule. 2'
Allowing this flexibility would save the cost of enforcement and would
make the Forest Service and the BLM consistent, simplifying the regulatory system. The BLM stated that it considers subleasing valuable because
it allows permittees who are ill or nearing retirement to lease the permit
and, thus, "retain the integrity of the ranching unit until it can be transferred to their families."2' This argument has merit, but it also shows
how the BLM was not able to question the dominance of grazing on
public lands. One comment on subleasing was that the BLM should forbid
it in order to give others a chance to obtain permits. 2% The BLM did not
directly respond to this comment, showing an apparent lack of interest in
having permits go to non-ranchers.
The government's assertion of ownership of new, permanent range
improvements and new water rights seems justified because those improvements and rights will remain if the rancher leaves. 2' Although
Farmers Turned Loose on a FreerMarket; New Law Has a Little Bit for Everyone; CHI. TRIB.; Apr.
5, 1996, at 1.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 155-64.
293. See supra text accompanying note 156.
294. Forest Service Announcement, supra note 129, at 43,204.
295. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 146.
296. Id. at 145. Conservation groups interested in obtaining permits to rest the land is one
example of those who would have an easier time getting permits if subleasing did not occur.
297. In Public Lands Council v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 929 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Wyo. 1996),
the Wyoming District Court held that the 1995 regulation regarding title to range improvements contradicted the Taylor Grazing Act. Under 43 U.S.C. § 315(c), if a permittee receives a grazing permit
for land on which a prior occupant had constructed a range improvement, the new permittee is required to pay the prior occupant reasonable compensation for the improvement. Citing this section of
the TGA, the court concluded that this compensation requirement "strongly suggests that the individual who constructed the improvement should own it." 929 F. Supp. at 1442-43.
The court also struck down regulations regarding "conservation use" and the substitution of
"permitted use" for "grazing preference." See infra notes 304 and 305. Other regulations challenged
by the petitioners, but upheld by the court, dealt with limits on temporary non-use, non-exclusive use
of water diversions by permitees, the fundamentals of rangeland health, and the new definition of
.affiliate." 929 F. Supp. at 1442-48.
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Senator Hank Brown said the policy would discourage them from conserving Water,29 other incentives for good stewardship, such as eligibility

for short-term permits, would probably be sufficient to prevent wasting
water. Also, if a permittee contributed money as part of a cooperative
development with the government, he or she would have a proportional
interest in the development. 29
C. Stewardship
The final rules weakened, but did not eliminate, the government's
ability to encourage stewardship, defined as an "individual's responsibility
to manage natural resources on public land."' The expansion of the
definition of "prohibited acts" to include most resource protection laws
will prevent those who damage the environment from grazing the federal
lands.3"' However, the potential of shorter tenures for those who do not
care for the land would have provided added encouragment for good
stewardship.' Ranchers complained that such instability would hinder
their ability to get stable funding from banks, and this led to a return to
standard ten-year permits. 33° Likewise, the ability to disqualify current
permittees from renewals would have been a powerful tool. The withdrawal of these proposals is unfortunate because ranchers will have less
incentive to comply with the agencies' ecosystem management initiatives.
If ecological stability is to be a main goal of the government, it needs to
structure all its policies to help achieve that goal.
The delinking of grazing preferences and a specified amount of
forage is a sound policy.' The ecology and climate of the West is highly

The Department of Interior is not satisfied with the court's decision, and the government has
appealed the case. Meanwhile, two additional cases brought by ranching interests are pending against
the government in Utah Federal District Court. See Salt, supra note 101.
298. Deborah Frazier, Rangeland "Reform" is a Disaster. Rancher Says, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
June 2, 1994, at 6A.
299. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 17.
300. DRAFr EIS, supra note 106, at GL-19.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 178-86.
303. See Babbitt, supra note 119.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 194-200. As indicated in note 297, the Wyoming Federal District Court struck down the regulation regarding the elimination of "grazing preference."
Public Lands Council v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 929 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Wyo. 1996), In doing so, the
court relied heavily on the history of the TGA, stressing the importance of the lengthy adjudication

process used by the Department of Interior to award grazing preferences to qualified applicants between the 1930s and 1950s. As a result of these adjudications, the court stated, the term "grazing
preference" came to represent "an adjudicated right to place livestock on public lands." Id. at 1440.
Whereas the TGA (43 U.S.C. § 315(h)) requires an evidentiary hearing before a "grazing preference"
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variable, and ranchers should not expect the same amount of forage every
year. The expansion of conservation use permits" will allow more flexibility for local officials, but whether they will use that flexibility will
depend on those officials' attitudes and the views of the resource councils.
Officials should aggressively use their authority to encourage conservation
and resting of damaged areas. One potential impediment to conservation
is the language in the final EIS indicating that once resource goals are
met, an area will no longer be eligible for conservation use.' Resource
goals are set in management plans and, therefore, if a management plan
does not call for conservation, then the BLM may be unable to approve
conservation use of a grazing allotment covered by that plan. The potential consequences of this are unclear. It seems contradictory for the BLM
to increase flexibility for conservation and at the same time add a new requirement for those same permits, but management plans themselves may
be flexible enough to allow expanded conservation. Even if an allotment
is already in satisfactory condition, if a permittee wants to continue conserving the land, then that option should exist because conservation is
inherently not damaging to the land and the BLM should allow such good
stewardship.
Reorganizing short-term permits for normally ungrazed areas seems
like an administrative improvement that will encourage stewardship, since
any extra forage will go to those who are good stewards. How often the
agencies should grant these short-term permits is an unanswered question.
Even if the government could award a short-term permit, the better choice
might be to leave those AUMs unallocated to help rest damaged land.
D. Bureaucracy
The Forest Service and the BLM did not fully achieve their goal
of consistency in their rules. This was a complaint in the final EIS
could be cancelled or otherwise modified, the court felt that a "permitted use," being only a "right of
renewal" would provide less protection. Id. at 1441. Consequently, the court held that the BLM's
attempt to eliminate the term "grazing preference" in favor of the term "permitted use" failed to
safeguard "grazing preferences," as the TGA requries in 43 U.S.C. § 315(b). Id.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06. The Wyoming District Court also struck down
the regulations expanding "conservation use." 929 F. Supp. at 1443-44. According to the court, 'the
Taylor Grazing Act authorizes the Secretary to issue permits to graze these lands, but it does not
authorize the Secretary to issue permits allowing permittees to remove public lands from grazing for
ten-year periods." Id. The court also found that the concept of "conservation use" contradicted
FLPMA's definition of livestock grazing as a "principal or major use." Id. In the court's opinion,
livestock grazing could not be the "principal or major use" of land that had been set aside for conservation purposes; therefore, by allowing permits for uses other than livestock grazing, the BLM had
exceeded its statutory authority under the TGA. Id. at 1444.
306. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 16.
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comments,30 7 but the agencies did not really respond to it. They simply stated consistency was a goal, and some rules were made consistent, 3°8 such as the national and regional standards and guidelines,109
the penalty policy for unintentional unauthorized uses, 310 the shortterm permit policy, 31' and range improvement and water right ownership policy.3 2 Other policies would remain different, such as advisory
councils, "suspended use," and subleasing. Neither the draft nor the
final EIS justified these discrepancies.3 13
Increasing the Forest Service's penalties for willful violations, exempting minor unintentional violations, and allowing decisions to go into
effect immediately to counter frivolous appeals seem like sensible changes
to improve the government's ability to enforce its rules."4 Whether the
penalties would be enough to deter violations, and whether the agencies
will have adequate funding for enforcement remain unanswered questions.
The potential exemption from fines for unintentional trespasses 3 " could
lead to decreased oversight of livestock by ranchers, producing more
unintentional violations, but, on the whole, the exemption probably will
be beneficial by reducing enforcement costs. The Forest Service's decision not to amend its rules 316 makes consistency between the agencies
impossible to ascertain.
The BLM abandoned its attempt to abolish the concept of "suspended nonuse" for administrative purposes because of complaints from ranchers. Ranchers worried the abolition would adversely impact property
values by taking away something that had been part of the measure of a

ranch's value. 3" The BLM argued that it rarely makes suspended AUMs
available again for livestock, that it has no need to keep track of them
anymore, and that the abolition would reduce the BLM's record-keeping
burden, but the agency simply withdrew the proposal due to the "contentious nature of the issue."3' This strong opposition to what was merely an
administrative house-keeping measure illustrates the depth of suspicion

307.

The Final EIS did not identify the authors of any comments. Id. at 48-153.
308. Id. at 48.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 207-16.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 263-70.

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See supra text accompanying notes 256-62.
See supra text accompanying notes 165-74.
See generally DRAFr EIS, supra note 106, and FINAL EIS, supra note 133.
See supra text accompanying notes 263-70 and 240-46.
See supra text accompanying notes 263-70.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 144.
BLM Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 14,323.
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and fear ranchers have of federal agency reforms. Of course, as indicated
earlier,319 the BLM's inconsistent treatment of "suspended use" contributed to the confusion regarding the concept and may have created some of
this suspicion. Nevertheless, "suspended use" seems like an anachronistic
term that the BLM should eliminate. Allocation of forage could be subject
to a much more simple system. Permittees should receive AUMs based on
current ecological conditions of their allotments. If the BLM allocates
temporary forage, it should go to those permittees who are being good
stewards of their lands, not those who have "suspended use" AUMs
dating from years ago.
The plan to let local BLM and Forest Service officials formulate
guidelines for grazing permits could increase local flexibility, 3" but
whether this is ecologically beneficial would depend on how the local
officials interpret their mandates. The standards in the Final EIS are
rather specific in some cases, 32 and the requirements for state standards
and the fallback standards are actually very similar with many sections
having identical wording. 3' However, the standards are vague enough to
allow creative interpretation by local officials and RACs,3 which could
allow weaker standards. On the other hand, the final EIS states that state
guidelines must meet the national requirements, including ensuring that
watersheds are properly functioning and ensuring that state water quality
standards are met.3" Water quality standards could be useful in protecting
riparian areas, assuming they are placed in permit terms and conditions,
as the final EIS contemplates. 3" If the BLM or Forest Service decided not
to put water quality requirements (or some other requirement) in some
permits or gave an excessively long period of time to comply with the
standards, administrative or judicial review of this decision could be
difficult, since the standards and guidelines are not part of the Code of
Federal Regulations. 3" Considering the general theme of the guidelines,

319. See supra text accompanying notes 247-55.
320. See Babbitt, supra note 119.
321.

See supra note 224.

322. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 170-73.
323. The standards have some discretionary terms, such as calling for "adequate amounts of
ground cover" and "permeability rates appropriateto climate and soils." Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
324. Id.at 56, 60, 168.
325. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 60, 168-70, 172, 173. For example, state guidelines "will
meet the following requirements . .. 5) Management actions will maintain, restore, or enhance water
quality to meet or exceed State water quality standards... " Id. at 170.
326. The final rules affirm that terms and conditions of permits will be the principle vehicle for
implementing standards and guidelines. BLM Final Rules, supra note 13, at 9,941. But cf. Parker v.
United States, 448 F.2d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1971) (quoting from the Forest Service Manual as if it

were an enforceable regulation).
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the BLM should aggressively use its discretion to require improved water
quality and riparian area management.
VI. CONCLUSION

What should be the goals of grazing reform? The government and
ranchers need to realize that public lands cannot support the current
amount of grazing. The GAO has stated that, based on the best available
information, 20 percent of grazing allotments are being grazed beyond a
sustainable level. 3' 7 Even with no grazing or an "environmental enhancement" option," some land would still be non-functioning or not meeting
goals after twenty years.329 This reflects the degree of damage 140 years
of overgrazing has done to the West.
Those who wish to reduce grazing need to realize there are different
kinds of ranchers. Ranchers who use only private land have more incentive to be good stewards because it is their land, and they raise livestock
only if they can afford to. Small family ranchers who use private and
public land often want do a good job of caring for land and are afraid of
losing their businesses.33 However, small operations may not be able to
afford to take care of land as well as they should.331 Larger operations
apparently spend more money than smaller ones on range improvements.332 On the other hand, large ranchers with permits, often corporations, have less incentive and less personal desire to care for land because
they do not rely on the ranch for their personal income. Spending money
on improvements does not necessarily mean they spend it with an ecological approach to the land. Instead, they maintain marginal ranch operations
to have the opportunity to search for minerals, to use ranch losses as tax
breaks for their corporate profits, or as vacation retreats where making
profits is unimportant.333 Much of the land corporations lease is in poor

327.

See MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED, supra note 102, at 3.

328. See supra note 271.
329. DRAFT EIS, supra note 106, at 48-51. The new rules, the livestock production option, and
prior management methods would all result in similar improvements in upland conditions, while the
new rules should result in somewhat better riparian conditions than the other two methods would
produce. These three alternatives would all leave significant areas in poor condition after 20 years,
from 16% to 24% of riparian areas and about 12% of upland areas. The environmental enhancement
and no grazing options result in almost identical land conditions after 20 years, which would be significantly better than the other three options, with only 2% to 3% of riparian areas not functioning or

not meeting goals and 5% of upland areas in the same situation. Id.
330. Elliot Diringer, Rough Times on the Range, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13, 1994, at Al.
331. Reforming the Western Range, DIFFERENT DRUMMER, Spring 1994, at 29.
332.

Id.

333. See Diringer, supra note 330.
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condition. 3M Environmentalists and small ranchers can at least find common areas of interest, such as the desire for preserving open space and a
simple way of life. 3 5 Those interested in reform need to see the distinctions among different permittees and aim criticism selectively because,
otherwise, the targets (intended and unintended) of the criticism may feel
unfairly attacked or feel that the critic does not understand the circumstances of western grazing.
Considering the different problems created by different kinds of
permit holders, the government could establish different fee rates and
perhaps different regulations or standards for different size ranches.
Those with a small ranching operation could get a low fee and larger
operations would get a higher, market rate fee. 336 A lower rate for small
ranches would reduce the fear of small ranches going out of business, but
would produce some extra money for the government. In addition, in implementing the local standards and guidelines, the government could
consider the size of the operation when developing timelines for compliance, allowing more time for small operations. The fear of small
ranchers going bankrupt should not stop the agencies from requiring a fair
fee and improved stewardship from permittees who have no other incentive to take care of their allotments.
Many ranchers might not realize, because of a lack of accurate
information or simple disbelief, the ecological problems with overgrazing
or realize the small contribution western ranching makes to the nation's
economy. Some comments in the final EIS express fear that beef prices
and imports would increase if the proposed rules and fees went into effect. However, the agencies responded that even under a no grazing
option, the impact on beef prices would be negligible, since such a small

334.

For example, J.R. Simplot, president of Ore-Ida Potato, had permits for over a million

acres of BLM land in 1991, and, according to the government, 85 % of it was in unsatisfactory condition. The Metropolitan Life insurance company had 800,000 acres, 85% in unsatisfactory condition.
See Belsky, supra note 111.
335. Brad Knickerbocker, Bruce Babbitt and the East-West PoliticalShowdown, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, June 21, 1994, at 11.

336. The authors still see competitive bidding as a preferable method, but in lieu of bidding, or
where bidding may not work, this sliding-scale fee system may work well. See supra text accompanying notes 286-89 The Final EIS briefly discussed a tiered fee system, but the government argued
that it would be too costly and impractical. See FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 110. Because the current fee is costly to the government in terms of the subsidy ranchers receive, the government should
look more closely at this tiered method, since the Final EIS claimed that it would provide relief to
small operations. Id.
In the 104th Congress, Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) offered an amendment to S. 1459
which would have required large ranches to pay fees similar to what they would pay under state fee
systems. The amendment lost 52-47. See O'Connor, supra note 285, at 1.
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percentage of U.S. beef comes from federal land.337 Some argued that
livestock are beneficial because they reduce the threat of fire. The agencies explained that livestock do reduce fire by consuming potential fuel,
but that fire is an integral part of functioning ecosystems and, because of
livestock, prescribed burning is often needed to sustain desirable ecosystems."' Better education of ranchers and the public in general would increase support for changes in grazing practices. Many ranchers think they
are doing a good job of conserving range resources, and therefore want
the government to leave them alone. The final EIS acknowledges that
range management has improved significantly since the passage of the
Taylor Grazing Act and that much of the existing damage to riparian
areas probably occurred prior to the TGA.339 A major problem, however,
is that riparian areas need still better protection to achieve their ecological
potential.' Even if management today is much better than before enactment of the TGA sixty years ago, and even if most damage occurred before modem grazing regulation, the problem is that the land has not had
enough rest to recover from decades of abuse." Ranchers may think they
are doing a good job with what they have, but even when this is true,
they do not realize that the land they have now is a poor comparison to
what once was the open, ungrazed range. Support for less grazing or
ecologically-sensitive grazing will increase only if the government makes
a more convincing argument that changes will improve the range over the
long run.
While the agencies acknowledge that the reforms would hurt some
ranchers,342 the reality is that even under the current system (or a system
geared towards livestock production) income, jobs, and grazeable land
would decline. 3' Nevertheless, other than stating that the economic effects would be smaller than many feared and small overall,' the agencies
failed to respond to concerns that some ranchers would go out of busi-

337. See FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 130 and see supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
338. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 70, 95. Western ecosystems are not adapted to livestock
because they evolved without any large herbivores, unlike the Midwest prairie, which evolved with

the bison. Id.at 75. As a result, western grasses do not reproduce well when grazed upon by livestock. See Belsky, supra note 111.
339. FINAL EIS, supra note 133, at 103.
340. See generally, SOME RIPARIAN AREAS RESTORED, supra note 102.

341. See supra text accompanying notes 16-69.
342. DRAFT EIS, supra note 106, at 4-14.
343. See supra note 271. The proposed rules and fees would cause an estimated net loss of
2,167 jobs in the first five years and a net loss of 3,195 jobs over twenty years. In comparison, the
status quo would lead to a loss of 710 jobs over five years and 2,643 jobs over twenty years. DRAFT
EIS, supra note 106, at P-2, P-3.
344. FINAL EIS. supra note 133, at 113-14, 132-33.
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ness. A better, more comprehensive reform proposal would offer consulting and counseling services to ranchers as to how to adjust to the
world of ecologically-sensitive or fair market value ranching. Small
ranches, lacking information or funds to allow good stewardship, could be
eligible for subsidies and training on how to take better care of the public
rangelands. In cases where better stewardship means a marginal ranch
goes out of business, the government could ease the transition with information and training to facilitate conversion of the business to tourism or
recreation or for entering a new employment field. After allowing ecological damage and even encouraging it with subsidies for so long, the government should help guide ranchers away from such practices.
The "environmental enhancement" option considered by the agencies, which would have greatly reduced the AUMs available to ranchers
in favor of conservation,' combined with competitive bidding' for
grazing rights, seemed to be the most reasonable options presented in the
EISs. Ending all grazing would not result in more improvement in the
environment and would cause significantly more economic and social
displacement. Sustainable public lands grazing is possible if ranchers
manage the land with an ecological perspective, recognizing that the arid
West was never and will never be able to support many livestock, that
only with a great reduction in livestock numbers can federal lands achieve
ecological stability, and that the public lands have many values for different people. Ranchers must also recognize that ecological stability is in
their own long-term interest. They should realize that ignoring the historical damage to the range will cause a continual decline in the industry,
whereas the environmental enhancement option provides the hope of a stable, though smaller public lands ranching system. Finally, the reality is
that other uses, such as recreation and watershed protection, are placing
great demands on public lands. The environmental enhancement option
would have placed grazing as a legitimate, but smaller, part of the public
land constituency.
Bruce Babbitt's once strong calls for public use of western lands
have turned into a set of bureaucratic reforms that will improve the way
grazing occurs but will not seriously question the dominance of grazing
on public lands. The reforms will introduce the concept of Leopold's
'ecological conscience" into public lands management, 7 and will give
the BLM more tools and opportunities to limit grazing's damage to the
land. However, unless radically changed to provide for environmental
345. See supra note 271.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 271-325.
347. LEoPOLD, supra note 1, at 207.
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enhancement, they will not go far enough towards providing for noncommodity uses of federal lands and making ranchers more ecologically
minded, so that they may share Leopold's ambition of being "proud to be
the custodian of a reasonable portion of such areas, which add diversity
and beauty to his ... community."'

348. Id. at 212.
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